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WHAT DOES LAW HAVE TO DO WITH IT? THE JURY’S
ROLE IN CASES ALLEGING VIOLATIONS OF LAW,
CUSTOM, AND STANDARDS 
Barbara Kritchevsky 
INTRODUCTION 
Rules telling people how to act come from many sources.  
Statutory law governs a wide range of conduct—driving an auto-
mobile, operating a business, building a home.  Non-governmen-
tal standards reach just as far.  Individuals run their businesses in 
accordance with the law, but also by observing professional 
standards and industry customs.  A hotel owner might look to 
state or local law to determine how to fence the hotel pool or 
whether to have a lifeguard on duty.1  The owner might also de-
cide what to do by looking to industry customs or non-govern-
mental safety guidelines, such as those a private body has issued.2  
A failure to comply with any type of safety standard can result in 
tragedy—a child might drown in a hotel’s unfenced or unguarded 
pool.  And, in any case, the child’s parents are likely to argue that 
the hotel was negligent in failing to follow the governing stand-
ards. 
But different rules of tort law control the cases and judge and 
jury play different roles depending on the source of the standard.  
The hotel operator who violated a state or local law by operating 
      Cecil C. Humphreys Professor of Law and Director of Advocacy, University of Mem-
phis School of Law.  J.D. Harvard Law School; B.A. Middlebury College.  I offer thanks to 
my colleagues who gave input and suggestions as I worked on this Article: Andrew McClurg, 
Ernie Lidge, and Kate Schaffzin.  I also thank research assistants Brandon Stout, Sarah 
Smith, Madeline Bertasi, Robert Scott Evans and especially Mallory Farrar for her help when 
this Article was in its final stages. 
1. See generally Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1970) (discussing state 
statute and administrative regulations that required a lifeguard or warning signs at certain 
swimming pools). 
2. See generally AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST. ET AL., NO. ANSI/APSP/ICC-1 2014, 
STANDARD FOR PUBLIC SWIMMING POOLS (2014) (setting standards for public swimming 
pools); ASS’N OF POOL & SPA PROFESSIONALS, www.apsp.org [http s://perma.cc/X29N-
9PQ7] (offering services such as safety guidance and certification).   
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an unfenced pool would generally be negligent per se.3  The judge 
would instruct the jury that the statute set the relevant duty of care, 
and the jury would determine only whether the hotel violated the 
statute and if the violation caused the child’s death.4  The hotel 
that violated industry custom or private guidelines would not be 
per se negligent.  The jury would at most consider the custom or 
safety guidelines, along with other evidence, to determine 
whether the hotel’s actions were reasonable.5  The plaintiff would 
still have to prove all aspects of negligence, including that the de-
fendant breached the relevant standard of care. 
Courts treat the situations differently because the hotel in the 
first example violated the law; a legislative body6 determined that 
3. An “actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor violates a statute that is designed
to protect against the type of accident the actor’s conduct causes, and if the accident victim 
is within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). Not 
all jurisdictions recognize the doctrine of negligence per se, but it is the law in the “strong 
majority” of jurisdictions.  Id. § 14 reporters’ note at 163. 
4. See infra note 181 & text accompanying note 182 (discussing jury instructions in 
negligence-per-se cases); Wendland v. Ridgefield Constr. Servs. Inc., 439 A.2d 954, 956 
(Conn. 1981); David P. Leonard, The Application of Criminal Legislation to Negligence 
Cases: A Reexamination, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 427, 448-50 (1983) (explaining jury’s 
limited role in negligence-per-se cases).  
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 13 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2010); see infra text accompanying notes 255-56 (dis-
cussing jury instructions on noncompliance with custom).  Custom includes standards that 
private organizations promulgate and government agencies’ recommendations.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 
cmt. e. For a general discussion of the rule of custom in negligence cases, see DAN B. DOBBS, 
THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 163-164 (2000).  
6. Courts generally equate all sources of law in applying the doctrine of negligence
per se.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 14 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010); see also DOBBS, supra note 5, § 134, at 316 (noting 
that “the negligence per se rule may apply to any statutory instrument, including ordinances 
and administrative regulations” (footnotes omitted)); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 6.4, at 
147 (1999) (“Statutes also include the welter of administrative regulations and ordinances 
issued by federal, state, and local governments on matters of health and safety.”); infra text 
accompanying notes 162-64.  Courts also find that private standards that a legislative body 
has ratified give rise to negligence-per-se liability.  See infra Part II.D.   
As Epstein’s statement suggests, most courts conclude that state and federal laws 
and regulations have the same negligence-per-se effect.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. a; see Barbara Kritchevsky, 
Tort Law is State Law: Why Courts Should Distinguish State and Federal Law in Negligence-
Per-Se Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 71, 84 (2010). That does not mean that the conclusion 
is correct.  Violations of federal law should not have negligence-per-se effect under state tort 
law because that allows federal standards to alter a state’s common law and leads to the 
covert federalization of state tort law.  Id. at 123-29.  By the same token, there are compelling 
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safety required that the pool be fenced or a lifeguard be on duty.  
There was no such legislative judgment in the second case, so the 
defendant is not negligent per se.7  Neither the case law nor com-
mentary offers a clear explanation of why the law treats the situ-
ations differently, however.  Why should a legislative body’s de-
termination that safety requires certain precautions bind a jury, 
but not an industry’s custom or the directives of a private stand-
ard-setting organization?  Why should experts’ safety judgments 
carry less weight than those of a generalist law-making body? 
The rationale for the difference is not self-evident.  The cur-
rent law of negligence per se stems from cases that found individ-
uals who violated industry customs per se negligent.8  Negligence 
per se evolved to apply only to individuals who violated legal 
standards, but the cases and commentary give no clear explana-
tion for the change.9  Moreover, the distinction between law and 
custom is only partial.  The law treats compliance with law and 
custom the same when a defendant claims that compliance with 
accepted standards shows due care.10  Law and custom also re-
ceive the same treatment in related areas of the law.  Constitu-
tional tort doctrine recognizes that custom can have the force of 
law, and that custom may be a more potent regulator of conduct 
than the law on the books.11  Nonetheless, there appears to be no 
reasons to treat ordinances, regulations, and statutes differently in negligence-per-se litiga-
tion.  Id. at 89-91. 
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 13 cmt. e (stating that the violation of a private rule or standard does not implicate 
the Restatement provisions on negligence per se “because it is issued by a private body”); 
Id. § 13 cmt. c (treating standards in the same manner as custom); Griglione v. Martin, 525 
N.W.2d 810, 812 (Iowa 1994).   
8. See infra Part I.A.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. In both cases, compliance is relevant to the exercise of due care, but not determi-
native. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM §§ 13(a), 14 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (stating that compliance is only relevant to the 
jury’s determination, it is not determinative); see infra text accompanying note 243. 
11. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 168 (1970) (explaining that cus-
tom can have “the force of law”); Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Browning, 310 
U.S. 362, 369 (1940) (“Deeply embedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy . . . 
are often tougher and truer law than the dead words of the written text.”).  See generally 
Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983 
Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17 (2000).  The Third Restatement recognized that 
“[c]ustom plays a powerful role” in other areas of the law, as it can be the source of legal 
obligations in international law and an implied term in contracts under contract law.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010).   
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analysis as to why a defendant who does not take customary 
safety precautions may argue that his actions were reasonable, 
while one who breaks the law may not.12 
12. Early commentary actively debated the justifications for imposing tort liability on 
individuals who violated criminal standards.  See generally Charles L.B. Lowndes, Civil Li-
ability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REV. 361 (1932); William P. Malburn, 
The Violation of Laws Limiting Speed as Negligence, 45 AM. L. REV. 214 (1911); Clarence 
Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARV. L. REV. 453 (1933) 
[hereinafter Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes]; Ezra Ripley Thayer, Public Wrong 
and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1914).  There was otherwise very little academic 
discussion of negligence per se in the years preceding the 1965 enactment of the Second 
Restatement.  See Leonard, supra note 4, at 427 (noting in 1983 that there was little theoret-
ical analysis of the issue after the early 1950s).  Professors Fleming James and Clarence 
Morris wrote major articles developing this area in the years between the publication of the 
First and Second Restatements.  See generally Fleming James, Jr., Statutory Standards and 
Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. REV. 95, 104-05 (1950); Clarence Morris, The Role 
of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence Actions, 28 TEX. L. REV. 143 (1950) [here-
inafter Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures]; Clarence Morris, The Role of 
Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 21 (1949) [hereinafter Morris, 
The Role of Criminal Statutes].   
There continued to be relatively little scholarly discussion of negligence per se in 
the years between the Second and Third Restatements.  There were, however, some notable 
contributions to the literature.  See generally Caroline Forell, Statutory Torts, Statutory Duty 
Actions, and Negligence Per Se: What’s the Difference?, 77 OR. L. REV. 497 (1998); H. 
Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions 
in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501 (1986); Leonard, supra note 4; 
Harvey S. Perlman, Thoughts on the Role of Legislation in Tort Cases, 36 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 813 (2000); David E. Seidelson, The Appropriate Judicial Response to Evidence of the 
Violation of a Criminal Statute in a Negligence Action, 30 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1991); Paul 
Sherman, Use of Federal Statutes in State Negligence Per Se Actions, 13 WHITTIER L. REV. 
831 (1992); Paul Yowell, Judicial Discretion in Adopting Legislative Standards: Texas’s 
Solution to the Problem of Negligence Per Se?, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 109 (1997).  Most of 
the articles that discussed negligence per se at length, however, focused on the application 
of the doctrine in specific substantive areas.  See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, The Relation 
Between Civil Liability and Environmental Regulation: An Analytical Overview, 41 
WASHBURN L.J. 379 (2002); James M. Beck & John A. Valentine, Challenging the Viability 
of FDCA-Based Causes of Action in the Tort Context: The Orthopedic Bone Screw Experi-
ence, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 389 (2000); Sheila G. Bush, Can You Get There From Here?: 
Noncompliance with Environmental Regulations As Negligence Per Se in Tort Cases, 25 
IDAHO L. REV. 469 (1989); Andrew E. Costa, Negligence Per Se Theories in Pharmaceutical 
& Medical Device Litigation, 57 ME. L. REV. 51 (2005).   
Perhaps due to the publication of the Third Restatement, there has been a renewed 
interest in the last decade.  For recent commentary, see Robert F. Blomquist, The Trouble 
with Negligence Per Se, 61 S.C. L. REV. 221 (2009); Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law in the Age 
of Statutes, 99 IOWA L. REV. 957 (2014); Kritchevsky, supra note 6; Barbara Kritchevsky, 
Whose Idea Was It? Why Violations of State Laws Enacted Pursuant to Federal Mandates 
Should Not Be Negligence Per Se, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 693; Aaron D. Twerski, Negligence 
Per Se and Res Ipsa Loquitur: Kissing Cousins, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 997 (2009), and 
other articles published in Issue One of Wake Forest’s Symposium, Third Restatement of 
Torts, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877 (2009).  
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The unquestioning acceptance of the fact that violations of 
law and custom are different prevents courts from considering 
what the law of custom can teach about the proper reach of the 
doctrine of negligence per se.  Reasons for not giving violations 
of custom negligence-per-se effect also apply to violations of law.  
Statutes, like non-legal standards, may reflect outdated thinking 
or be ill-suited to specific situations.  The different treatment of 
violations of law and custom should also direct attention to the 
reasons underlying negligence per se.  The different treatment of 
law and non-legal standards does not logically follow, for exam-
ple, if negligence per se aims to substitute expert judgment on 
how to undertake a risky activity for a jury’s uneducated assess-
ment.13  It makes sense to treat violations of law differently from 
violations of private safety guidelines only if the legislative judg-
ment is key, if the legislature intended its rules to alter the law of 
torts.14 
This history of negligence per se also highlights another 
problem with the doctrine.  The current law of negligence per se 
developed against changing perceptions of the jury’s role in neg-
ligence litigation.  The early cases treated violations of law, cus-
tom, and court-made rules as negligence per se because courts 
found that juries could not properly approve of conduct that vio-
lated any of those standards.15  Courts are now much more reluc-
tant to take the negligence question from the jury.16  Courts rec-
ognize that individual cases present unique issues.  Those 
differences counsel against the imposition of a set standard of 
conduct, and support allowing the jury to assess the reasonable-
ness of any individual’s conduct.17  Courts have not, however, 
considered how this recognition applies to negligence-per-se 
cases. 
13. See Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures, supra note 12, at 147
(invoking this rationale to support instructing jurors that violations of administrative safety 
rules is negligence as a matter of law). 
14. One rationale for negligence per se has been the assumption that legislatures in-
tended to impose such liability.  See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS 220-21 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).  
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 142-48 (discussing the Third Restatement po-
sition). 
17. See infra text accompanying notes 105-14 (explaining the move away from treat-
ing violations of judge-made rules of conduct as negligence per se). 
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The doctrine of negligence per se has become more potent 
as tort law generally allows juries increased discretion.  The doc-
trine’s reach has broadened and become more rigid even as it op-
erates against a backdrop of increased flexibility in tort adjudica-
tion.  This Article argues that the doctrine of negligence per se 
should narrow in reach and become more flexible in operation 
better to accord with the jury’s current role in tort litigation.  A 
better course of action would be to return to history and to again 
equate violations of law and custom as the law has developed—
by treating violations of law as evidence of negligence, not neg-
ligence in itself. 
This Article discusses tort law’s evolving treatment of vio-
lations of law and non-legal standards and explains how the his-
tory shows the need to restrict the reach of negligence per se.  Part 
I of the Article discusses the origins of the negligence-per-se doc-
trine in non-statutory cases and explains how it evolved to apply 
only to violations of positive law.  Part II addresses the current 
law of negligence per se and courts’ current treatment of viola-
tions of law, custom, and non-legal standards.  Part III explains 
how courts hinge the negligence-per-se question on the legal sta-
tus of the standards the defendant violated while failing to apply 
this rule in a logical fashion or explain why the legal status of the 
standard should be determinative.  Part IV explains how the rea-
sons that courts do not give violations of custom negligence-per-
se effect also apply to violations of law and inform the doctrine 
of negligence per se.  Courts that are unwilling to abolish the doc-
trine should apply it more flexibly, in a way that better accords 
with the modern role of the jury. 
Negligence per se does not simply ease a plaintiff’s burden 
of proving negligence.  It alters the contours of a negligence claim 
and changes the roles of judge and jury.18  A court should not take 
this step unless it can confidently say that the legislature that en-
acted a legal standard intended it to carry that result, something it 
cannot do in the presence of legislative silence.19  Juries should 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 453-60.  See Leonard, supra note 4, at 429
(saying that negligence per se “amounts to an abandonment of judicial function in negligence 
cases” and “requires an abandonment of the traditional sphere of jury power in these so fact-
oriented cases”). 
19. See infra Part III.C.  Congress, on the other hand, cannot alter the state common-
law of negligence, so federal legislation should not have negligence-per-se effect.  See 
Kritchevsky, supra note 6, at 118-19. 
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decide negligence claims absent legislative mandates to the con-
trary. 
I. NEGLIGENCE PER SE AND CUSTOM: THE COMMON
ORIGIN 
Negligence per se did not start with cases involving statutory 
violations.  The doctrine originated in cases involving violations 
of custom and quickly came to apply to violations of statutes and 
judicially-imposed standards of conduct.20  The early cases did 
not distinguish violations of law and custom.  They used the term 
“negligence per se” to condemn conduct that a court determined 
was so imprudent that no reasonable jury would accept it.21  Dif-
ferent sources could establish which conduct merited this con-
demnation.22  Custom, common law, and statutes could all set 
standards of conduct that established a legal duty to prevent harm. 
A. The Common Origins
The first negligence per se case23 used the term to refer to a 
violation of custom; there was no statutory violation.  The case, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Simpson v. Hand,24 
found that the defendant acted negligently by anchoring a ship at 
night in a heavily-navigated waterway without the customary 
warning lights.25  The court explained that it was “a custom of the 
river” to display lights on very dark nights.26  Even though “there 
is no positive law to enforce it,” the failure to comply with the 
20. There is no clear history of the early days of the doctrine.  See DOBBS, supra note 
5, § 135, at 319 (stating that “[t]he history of the negligence per se rule seems not to have 
been written”).  For a detailed study that provides extensive commentary on the cases that 
were key to the development of negligence per se, see Blomquist, supra note 12.  
21. See Pa. R.R. Co. v. Beale, 73 Pa. 504, 509-10 (1873).
22. “The question of negligence is one for the court where the jury could not, as
rational beings, decide it otherwise than as the court does; or where there is a breach of a 
statute or city ordinance.”  H.I. D’Arcy, In What Sense is Negligence a Mixed Question of 
Fact and Law?, 2 CENT. L.J. 810, 813 (1875). 
23. Simpson v. Hand, 6 Whart. 311 (Pa. 1841), discussed in Blomquist, supra note 
12, at 225-26 (2009).  Simpson is the only case that Westlaw lists as using the term “negli-
gence per se” before 1850. 
24. 6 Whart. 311 (Pa. 1841).
25. Id. at 324-25. 
26. Id. at 324.
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custom courted disaster because an approaching vessel would ex-
pect others to conform to the custom.27  The court said that it 
could not consider the omission of a precaution “so imperiously 
demanded by prudence” as anything other than “negligence per 
se.”28 
Cases in the same time period began also to look at statutory 
violations as evidence of negligence.  The first case that found a 
defendant negligent for violating a statute, Ernst v. Hudson River 
Railroad Co.,29 considered both customary and statutory obliga-
tions.30  The suit was a wrongful death action to recover for the 
death of a person who was hit by a train.31  The plaintiff argued 
that the train operator failed to give sufficient warning of the 
train’s approach.32  The court held that the defendants misled the 
deceased by failing to show a flag at the crossing “in accordance 
with the uniform custom” and by illegally approaching the high-
way without sounding a bell.33  Although the court did not use the 
term “negligence per se,” it explained that the railroad’s conduct 
was “in open defiance” of a statute enacted to protect travelers, 
and said that the law did not favor those who violated its man-
dates.34  The duty was “plain and absolute.”35  Other early cases 
emphasized that a person who violated a statutory obligation was 
per se negligent.  An 1876 Alabama Supreme Court decision that 
found a statutory violation to be negligence per se stated it was an 
27. Id.  The court explained that the presence of a custom generated an expectation 
regarding how others would act, and this expectation would not be present absent the custom. 
Id.  
28. Id.  Two other early cases discussed negligence per se in terms of whether the
defendant had violated a custom.  See Innis v. Steamer Senator, 1 Cal. 459, 459-60 (1851) 
(relying on Simpson in a ship collision case); Sparks v. Steamer Saladin, 6 La. Ann. 764, 
764-65 (1851) (distinguishing Simpson because there was no failure to conform to custom);
see also Blomquist, supra note 12, at 226-27.
29. 35 N.Y. 9 (1866).
30. See Blomquist, supra note 12, at 228 (discussing Ernst as the first such case).
Blomquist notes that two earlier cases considered statutory violations but did not impose 
liability.  Id.  (discussing Langlois v. Buffalo & Rochester R.R. Co., 19 Barb. 364 (N.Y. Gen. 
Term 1854), and Morse v. Rutland & Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 49 (1854)).  
31. Ernst, 35 N.Y. at 25.
32. Id. at 26.
33. Id. at 28.
34. Id. at 28-29.
35. Id. at 35.  Blomquist notes a previous New York case that rejected the idea that
violation of a statute would have tort law effect.  Blomquist, supra note 12, at 229 n.44 
(discussing Brown v. Buffalo & State Line R.R. Co., 22 N.Y. 191 (1860), and DOBBS, supra 
note 5, §132, at 319 n.2). 
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“axiomatic truth, that every person, while violating an express 
statute, is a wrongdoer, and, as such, is ex necessitate, negligent 
in the eye of the law.”36 
Other cases of the era explained that a person who violated 
a clear legal duty that courts established through common law de-
velopment was per se negligent.  Cases used the term to refer to 
conduct that the court thought was clearly dangerous, such as 
sticking an arm out of a moving vehicle.37  An 1873 Pennsylvania 
case declared: “There never was a more important principle set-
tled than . . . the fact of the failure to stop immediately before 
crossing a railroad track, is not merely evidence of negligence for 
the jury, but negligence per se, and a question for the court.”38  
Courts applied various common-law rules of negligence, such as 
the rules requiring an individual to stop, look, and listen at a rail-
way crossing and mandating that a driver be able to stop within 
the range of the car’s headlights, to take the question of whether 
an individual acted reasonably out of the jury’s hands.39 
The early negligence-per-se cases were one component of a 
struggle to determine how to allocate power properly between 
judge and jury in tort litigation, and to define the extent to which 
the negligence question was one of law for the court or fact for 
the jury.  One early treatise explained that the question of whether 
a party performed or omitted an act was a question of fact, but 
that the question of whether the performance or omission was a 
36. Grey’s Ex’r v. Mobile Trade Co., 55 Ala. 387, 403 (1876).  This language is not
original to Grey’s Executor v. Mobile Trade Co.  Numerous cases, apparently beginning with 
Jetter v. New York & Harlem R.R. Co., 2 Abb. Dec. 458, 464 (N.Y. 1865), use the identical 
language without identifying a source.  See, e.g., La Fayette v. Bass, 252 P. 1101, 1104 (Okla. 
1926); Correll v. Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Minn. R.R. Co., 38 Iowa 120, 124 (1874); 
Siemers v. Eisen, 54 Cal. 418, 421 (1880).  
37. Pittsburg & Connellsville R.R. Co. v. McClurg, 56 Pa. 294, 300 (1867) (finding 
that it was “negligence in se” for a traveler to put an arm out of a car window and the court 
could declare the act “negligence in law”); see also Brooks v. Inhabitants of Somerville, 106 
Mass. 271, 275 (1871) (listing cases—such as ones involving leaving a train after it has 
started or crossing a train by going between two cars in motion—in which a judge would 
properly instruct the jury that the party was not exercising reasonable care); Blomquist, supra 
note 12, at 229 n.45 (discussing additional cases).   
38. Pa. R.R. Co. v. Beale, 73 Pa. 504, 509-10 (1873) (finding that the failure to stop
at a crossing was contributory negligence). 
39. See DOBBS, supra note 5, § 132, at 309-10; see also Beale, 73 Pa. at 509-10
(stating that a failure to stop at a railroad crossing was negligence per se). See also cases 
discussed in Blomquist, supra note 12, at 227-44. 
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breach of a legal duty was “a pure question of law.”40  This view 
was not embraced universally.  Some opinions questioned 
whether it was appropriate for courts to declare conduct per se 
negligent.  A New York case, for example, questioned the ap-
plicability of negligence per se in the absence of a statutory 
duty.41  The court questioned whether courts could properly im-
pose a duty to fence railroad tracks from cattle “and hold its non-
performance to be negligence, per se, disregarding all other cir-
cumstances” absent a statute imposing an absolute duty to erect 
such fencing.42  The court did “not feel at liberty” to take that 
step.43  Although there is no further reasoning, the court’s state-
ment does suggest a recognition that courts and legislatures play 
different roles in defining law.  The negligence question would 
go to the jury if the standard of conduct were variable but not if 
the law fixed the standard.44  The unsettled question was the ex-
tent to which it was proper for courts to set standards with the 
force of law.45 
Cases at the turn of the century continued to use the term 
“negligence per se” to refer to violations of common law stand-
ards, customs, and statutes.  In 1899, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court stated that a breach of a legal duty was negligence, and that 
40. 1 THOMAS G. SHEARMAN & AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
NEGLIGENCE § 52 (5th ed. 1898); see also D’Arcy, supra note 22, at 810.  D’Arcy, writing 
in 1875, noted confusion surrounding the jury’s role in negligence cases because of uncer-
tainty as to whether the term “negligence” referred to an act or the characterization of the 
act.  Id. at 810-12.   
41. See Langlois v. Buffalo & Rochester R.R. Co., 19 Barb. 364, 370 (N.Y. Gen.
Term 1854), overruled by Donnegan v. Erhardt, 119 N.Y. 468 (1890). 
42. Langlois, 19 Barb. at 364.
43. Id. at 370.; See also Ohio & Miss. R.R. Co. v. Shanefelt, 47 Ill. 497, 499-501 
(1868) (rejecting argument that it was negligence per se to allow dry weeds and grass to 
accumulate near a railroad right of way, noting that no statute required removal of the growth 
and no court had declared such a legal duty). 
44. See N. Pa. R.R. Co. v. Heileman, 49 Pa. 60, 63-64 (1865) (stating this principle 
and giving examples of situations in which courts fixed the standard). 
45. See generally Martin A. Kotler, Social Norms and Judicial Rulemaking: Commit-
ment to Political Process and the Basis of Tort Law, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 65, 70-75 (2000) 
(discussing the legitimacy of judicial rulemaking); Leonard, supra note 4, at 431-33 (dis-
cussing courts’ development of standards of conduct and reasons for backing away from the 
practice).  
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it was “immaterial” whether common law or a state statute estab-
lished the duty.46  A series of North Carolina Supreme Court de-
cisions around that time held that railroads that did not use auto-
matic train couplers were per se negligent even though there were 
no laws mandating their use.47  The courts relied on the fact that 
the use of automatic couplers had become customary, explaining 
that it was negligence not to use approved safety appliances that 
were in general use.48  Other cases used the term negligence per 
se to refer to statutory violations.49  Failure to obey a statutory 
mandate requiring a train to stop at a crossing, for example, was 
negligence per se.50 
Many courts of the time used statutory standards as the basis 
for tort liability by considering legislative action an indication 
that conduct was clearly wrong.  As one early treatise reasoned, 
many early safety statutes were “simply the legislative enact-
ments of what had already become a universal and established 
custom of our country.”51  An early court explained that when the 
legislature acted in response to conduct so universally wrong that 
it attracted legislative attention, the commission of the forbidden 
act “is for civil purposes correctly called negligence per se.”52 
46. Osborne v. McMasters, 41 N.W. 543, 543-44 (Minn. 1889); see generally
Blomquist, supra note 12, at 230-31 nn.54-55 (discussing cases). 
47. See Troxler v. S. Ry. Co., 32 S.E. 550, 550-52 (N.C. 1899); Greenlee v. S. Ry.
Co., 30 S.E. 115, 115-16 (N.C. 1898); Witsell v. W. Asheville & Sulphur Springs Ry. Co., 
27 S.E. 125, 126-27 (N.C. 1897); Mason v. Richmond & Danville R.R. Co., 16 S.E. 698, 
702-03 (N.C. 1892).  Indeed, a railroad’s failure to have the devices was negligence per se
even though the railroad was under no legislative compulsion to use them.  Greenlee, 30 S.E.
at 115 (explaining that the fact that Interstate Commerce Commission rules requiring auto-
matic couplers did not go into effect until 1900 only meant that railroads were not subject to 
administrative penalties); see also Troxler, 32 S.E. at 550-51 (discussing development of the
law).
48. Witsell, 27 S.E. at 126.  It was negligence per se for an employer not to use “safer
appliances [that] have been invented, tested, and have come into general use.”  Troxler, 32 
S.E. at 550. 
49. See S. Ry. Co. v. Bryan, 28 So. 445, 449 (Ala. 1899); Blomquist, supra note 12, 
at 233-35 (discussing Bryan). 
50. Richmond & Danville R.R. Co. v. Freeman, 11 So. 800, 803 (Ala. 1892).
51. BYRON K. ELLIOTT & WILLIAM F. ELLIOTT, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ROADS
AND STREETS § 828 (2d ed. 1900). 
52. Platt v. S. Photo Material Co., 60 S.E. 1068, 1070 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908).  The 
United States Supreme Court offered the same explanation in a case finding New York’s 
worker’s compensation law constitutional.  See N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 
198 (1917). 
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The early cases did not articulate any consistent rationale for 
the developing law of negligence per se,53 but courts’ explana-
tions for their decisions often rested on rationales that were only 
applicable to statutory violations.  Some cases viewed negligence 
per se in a punitive light, suggesting that tort liability was an ap-
propriate penalty for violating the law.54  The Alabama Supreme 
Court’s 1876 statement calling it an “axiomatic truth” that every 
person who violated a statute was “a wrongdoer, and, as such, is, 
ex necessitate, negligent in the eye of the law” illustrates this 
logic.55  Other cases focused on the need for courts to defer to 
legislative judgment.56  The Ohio Supreme Court explained in 
1914 that juries cannot say that something that is not the law is 
the law, “so they should not be permitted to say that which is the 
law is not the law.”57  Other courts relied on the idea that the ex-
istence of a right guaranteed a remedy—ubi jus ibi remedium.58  
53. See Blomquist, supra note 12, at 230.
54. Professor Fleming James called this the “outlaw” theory of negligence per se and 
said it was a “barbarous relic of the worst there was in puritanism.”  James, supra note 12, 
at 104-05; see 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.6, at 616-18 (2d ed. 
1986) (making the same argument); see also, e.g., White v. Levarn, 108 A. 564, 565 (Vt. 
1918) (finding individual who voluntarily committed the unlawful act of hunting on Sunday 
liable for injuries to fellow hunter whom he shot); Koonovsky v. Quelette, 116 N.E. 243, 
244 (Mass. 1917) (holding individual driving an unregistered car was an outlaw liable for all 
injury directly resulting from that act); Osborne v. Van Dyke, 85 N.W. 784, 785-86 (Iowa 
1901) (finding individual who violated a statute prohibiting cruelty to animals liable to a 
person he injured with a blow meant for his horse); Nashville, Chattanooga & Saint Louis 
Ry. Co. v. Heggie, 12 S.E. 363, 364 (Ga. 1890) (finding shipper who failed to comply with 
a law regulating the shipment of animals in interstate transit liable for animals’ lost value 
even though statute was anti-cruelty legislation).   
55. Grey’s Ex’r v. Mobile Trade Co., 55 Ala. 387, 403 (1876) (emphasis in original);
see supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing this phrase).  Other cases took a similar 
approach, treating someone who violated a statute as a wrongdoer who was not entitled to 
the protection of the laws.  Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. State, 29 Md. 252, 261 (1868); see also 
Koonovsky, 116 N.E. at 244 (considering an unregistered vehicle a trespasser on the highway 
and the driver an “outlaw” liable for injury he caused); Van Norden v. Robinson, 45 Hun, 
567, 570 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1887) (calling violation of a statute a nuisance).   
56. See infra notes 70-71 & accompanying text (explaining that this was a point em-
phasized by early treatises). 
57. Variety Iron & Steel Works Co. v. Poak, 106 N.E. 24, 27 (Ohio 1914) (citation 
omitted). 
58. Treatises of the era supported that position.  The most explicit statement was in 
Francis Wharton’s 1871 treatise.  He explained that a violation of a statutory requirement 
that a person act or refrain from acting to benefit another was negligence even if the statute 
provided no specific remedy.  “In such cases applies the maxim, Ubi jus ibi remedium.”  
FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE, § 443 (2d ed. 1878); see 
also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH 
ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 790 (2d ed. 1888) (stating that when a statute imposes 
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They believed the doctrine was necessary to give full effect to 
legislative dictates, preventing statutory mandates from becoming 
a dead letter.  An 1899 Sixth Circuit case explained this idea in 
holding that a railroad’s failure to comply with state railway-
safety legislation was negligence per se.59  The legislature passed 
the act to secure a right, the court explained, and confining the 
remedy to criminal proceedings “would make the law not much 
more than a dead letter.”60 
The turn-of-the-century cases, then, set forth disparate ra-
tionales to justify adopting statutory standards in tort cases.  They 
did not, however, discuss whether those rationales were unique to 
statutes.  And they did not discuss whether the existence of a stat-
utory standard should change the normal role of a jury in deciding 
a tort case. 
B. The Emerging Focus on Law
Early cases began to explain negligence per se in terms that 
applied specifically to statutory violations.  It was certainly true, 
though, as the Georgia Court of Appeals noted in 1908, that in the 
early 1900s the term “negligence per se” had not acquired “that 
precise and definite meaning so essential to the prevention of am-
biguity.”61  It is unclear how the term acquired its current, limited 
a duty to benefit individuals and a breach of the duty injures an individual, the common law 
“will supply a remedy, if the statute gives none”). 
59. Narramore v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chi. & Saint Louis Ry. Co., 96 F. 298, 300
(6th Cir. 1899). 
60. Id. at 300-01.  The court explained that the fact the legislature provided for crim-
inal penalties as one means of furthering its goal of protecting railroad employees from injury 
did not preclude the use of other, “more efficacious, means” of securing compliance.  Id. at 
300. The court stated “it follows” that a person who suffered an injury due to the railroad’s 
breach of duty had a cause of action if the statute did not explicitly preclude other remedies.
Id.
This reasoning essentially made negligence per se a way to imply a damages rem-
edy under a statute.  The Supreme Court used that approach in Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), a case recognizing that a railroad employee could sue the em-
ployer to recover for injuries attributable to the railroad’s violation of federal safety laws. 
See generally id.  The Court explained that the disregard of the statute was a “wrongful act,” 
and the common law gave the person for whose benefit the statute was enacted a right to 
recover from the wrongdoer.  Id. at 39.  “This is but an application of the maxim, Ubi jus ibi 
remedium.”  Id. at 39-40 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *51, *123).  The 
Court further explained that the statute’s provision stating the injured employee could not be 
deemed to have assumed the risk made “[t]he inference of a private right of action . . . irre-
sistible.”  Id. at 40. 
61. Platt v. S. Photo Material Co., 60 S.E. 1068, 1070 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908).
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meaning.  Although the early cases and treatises helped explain 
why courts adopted legislative standards as the tort standard of 
care, they did not reject the notion that the concept also applied in 
other contexts or explain why the courts began to consider only 
statutory violations as negligence per se.62 
Early treatises and commentary may be responsible for the 
shift in emphasis and courts’ decisions limiting negligence per se 
to statutory violations.63  The turn-of-the-century treatises did not 
have sections devoted to the concept of negligence per se.  They 
contained sections discussing how a defendant’s violation of a 
statute was relevant to tort liability, and a number of treatises used 
the term negligence per se in the headings of these sections.64  
This organization would logically lead courts and researchers to 
equate negligence per se with statutory violations.65  Perhaps fol-
lowing this organization, the treatises used the term “negligence 
per se” in discussing only the tort consequences of statutory vio-
lations.  This, in turn, may have influenced courts to consistently 
use the term “negligence per se” to refer to statutory violations 
62. Some courts had certainly questioned whether violations of non-statutory stand-
ards should ever impose negligence-per-se liability.  See supra text accompanying notes 41-
47. My research, though, has not uncovered any case or commentary that discusses why, to
the extent that non-statutory violations were once negligence per se, that should cease to be 
the case.
63. Courts and commentators discussing other areas of the law have recognized that
early treatises were very influential and, indeed, were sometimes responsible for changing 
the substantive law.  See Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 837 n.3 (Wis. 
1983) (discussing commentary on how an 1877 treatise, which stated that the rule of em-
ployment at will was inflexible, influenced the law even though the cases it cited did not 
support that proposition); Leonard J. Stern & Daniel F. Grosh, A Visit with Queen Caroline: 
Her Trial and Its Rule, 6 CAP. U. L. REV. 165, 201-02 (1976) (discussing how an 1842 trea-
tise that cited only British cases influenced the leading American treatise and established the 
rule in American law).  
64. See FOWLER VINCENT HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 78 (1933)
(section entitled “Negligence per se—Violation of statutory duties”); 1 SEYMOUR D. 
THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE IN ALL RELATIONS § 10 (1901) 
(section entitled “Negligence Per Se, or Statutory Negligence”); ARCHIBALD ROBINSON 
WATSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES § 252 (1901) 
(section entitled “Violation of Statute or Ordinance as Constituting Negligence—Negligence 
Per Se”);  see also COOLEY, supra note 58, § 311 (discussing negligence per se in sections 
entitled “Statutory Duties—Liability for Neglect” and “Other Neglects of Statutory Duty”); 
1 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 40, § 13 (discussing negligence per se in a section 
entitled “Violation of duty imposed by statute or ordinance”). 
65. The early law review articles were similar.  They discussed negligence per se in 
articles that debated the justification for attaching civil consequences to violations of crimi-
nal legislation.  See infra text accompanying notes 73-80.  These articles also influenced the 
developing law.  See infra notes 72-73. 
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even though they had previously recognized the doctrine using 
different terminology.66 
The turn-of-the-century treatises explained that statutory vi-
olations were negligence per se.  An 1897 treatise said that a per-
son who violated a statute was a “wrong-doer” and ordinarily neg-
ligent per se.67  Seymour Thomson’s 1901 negligence treatise 
stated that the rule of negligence per se was the only view “rec-
oncilable with reason”68 and argued that courts that failed to adopt 
the doctrine allowed juries to set aside legislative acts.69  The trea-
tises were very influential.  Numerous early cases relied on the 
treatises in discussing negligence per se and their view of the doc-
trine became the accepted law.70 
66. Compare Atlanta & W. Point R.R. v. Wyly, 65 Ga. 120, 122 (1880) (calling vio-
lation of statute “negligence”), and Dodge v. Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Minn. R.R. Co., 
34 Iowa 276, 279 (1872) (same) with Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Smith, 3 S.E. 397, 397 
(Ga. 1887) (calling violation of ordinance “negligence per se”); Tobey v. Burlington, Cedar 
Rapids & N. Ry. Co., 62 N.W. 761, 764-65 (Iowa 1895) (same).  Courts in that era also used 
other terminology in opinions finding individuals liable for failing to follow a statute.  See 
Brockway v. Am. Express Co., 47 N.E. 87, 87 (Mass. 1897) (saying that violation would be 
“gross negligence”); Burns v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 80 N.W. 927, 929 (Wis. 
1899) (calling statutory violation “actionable negligence”). 
67. 3 BYRON K. ELLIOTT & WILLIAM F. ELLIOTT, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
RAILROADS § 1155 (1897); see also 1 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 40, § 13 (“The 
violation of any statutory or valid municipal regulation, established for the benefit of private 
persons, is of itself sufficient to prove such a breach of duty as will sustain a private action 
for negligence, brought by a person belonging to the protected class . . . .”). 
68. 1 THOMPSON, supra note 64, § 10.
69. Id. § 11.  Thompson said courts that called a statutory violation only evidence of
negligence granted juries the “[d]ispensing [p]ower,” the power English kings had to set 
aside legislative acts and “sinks acts of the legislature below the grade of by-laws of corpo-
rations.” Id.  Thompson did note, however, that offenses against the public did not give rise 
to negligence-per-se liability, and that negligence-per-se liability required the statute that the 
defendant violated be one the legislature intended to prevent injuries like those the plaintiff 
suffered.  Id. § 12. 
A few early treatises discussed how custom was relevant in determining due care, 
but they did not use the term “negligence per se” when referring to violations of custom.  See 
ELLIOTT & ELLIOTT, supra note 51, § 828 (explaining that the customs of travel could be 
considered the law of the road); WILLIAM B. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 
231 (1896) (noting that custom and usage could almost amount to positive law); JOHN D. 
LAWSON, THE LAW OF USAGES AND CUSTOMS §§ 168-171 (1881) (discussing cases in var-
ious contexts in which evidence of custom was relevant to a determination of negligence). 
70. See, e.g., Platte & Denver Canal & Milling Co. v. Dowell, 30 P. 68, 72 (Colo.
1892) (citing Wharton treatise for proposition that violation of a statute is negligence per se); 
Leathers v. Blackwell’s Durham Tobacco Co., 57 S.E. 11, 15-16 (N.C. 1907) (quoting 
Thompson and Shearman & Redfield treatises for proposition that violation of an ordinance 
is negligence per se); Schell v. Du Bois, 113 N.E. 664, 667 (Ohio 1916) (quoting Thompson 
treatise in determining that violation of a municipal ordinance is negligence per se); Wise v. 
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Law review commentary built on the treatises, actively de-
bating whether it was proper to make a legislature’s judgment 
about what conduct merited criminal sanctions the standard of 
care in tort cases.  These articles used the term negligence per se 
to describe the doctrine the authors were debating, implicitly 
equating negligence per se with liability for statutory violations.71  
These works, especially Ezra Ripley Thayer’s article Public 
Wrong and Private Action, were influential and logically helped 
to cement the notion that the doctrine applied to statutory viola-
tions.72 
Thayer’s article was a response to a 1911 article by William 
Malburn condemning the negligence-per-se doctrine and arguing 
that a person who violated a law should only suffer the statutory 
penalty.73  Professor Thayer responded with a defense of the doc-
trine, arguing that a jury could not properly find that a person had 
Morgan, 48 S.W. 971, 972 (Tenn. 1898) (citing Thompson treatise for proposition that vio-
lation of a statutory duty is negligence per se).  
71. The articles recognized that not all courts followed that rule; some found that
violation of a statute was only evidence of negligence.  See, e.g., Malburn, supra note 12, at 
214; Thayer, supra note 12, at 317.   
72. Courts have cited Thayer from the 1920s to the present day, as do numerous arti-
cles.  See, e.g., Steinwedel v. Hilbert, 131 A. 44, 45 (Md. 1925); Cerda v. RJL Entm’t, Inc., 
443 S.W.3d 221, 227-28 228 n.4 (Tex. App. 2013); Yowell, supra note 12, at 112.  
73. See Malburn, supra note 12, at 217.  He argued that if a violation of a law could 
be the basis of a finding of negligence, an action for negligence could be brought on the 
statute.  Id. at 218.  This would create a right of action by implication, “an effect that is 
universally condemned.”  Id.  Malburn strongly criticized Thompson’s negligence treatise, 
supra note 64, saying that it “includes almost every fallacy by which courts have been mis-
led.”  Malburn, supra note 12, at 216; see supra notes 68-69 (discussing Thompson).  Other 
commentators also criticized the doctrine.  Lowndes argued that a court should not assume 
that a legislature intended an enactment to impose civil liability when it did not so provide.  
Lowndes, supra note 12, at 364.  Other early commentators argued that a person who violated 
a statute was not necessarily culpable.  See Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes, supra 
note 12, at 458 (explaining that individuals can violate criminal statutes without being “guilty 
of fault in any sense of the word”).  Morris objected that negligence per se removed the jury’s 
ability to decide how the defendant should have acted and reduced it to performing the “his-
torical” “function” of determining what happened.  Id. at 455.  
These are not the only arguments against the doctrine.  An article published after 
the First Restatement explained that the doctrine disregards the discretion inherent in the 
decision whether to enforce criminal statutes, ignores the fact that many statutes “are ill con-
ceived, or hastily drawn, or obsolete,” can lead to liability without fault or prevent a person 
who has not been meaningfully negligent from recovering, and exposes a person to substan-
tial damages when the statute imposes only a small penalty.  James, supra note 12, at 108. 
See also infra Part III.B (discussing these criticisms). 
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acted reasonably if the person disregarded the legislature’s judg-
ment regarding appropriate conduct.74  Although a legislature 
could expressly provide for civil liability, Thayer argued that the 
legislature must be presumed to know that a penal statute would 
affect private rights and intend that result.75 
Thayer articulated two primary justifications for negligence 
per se.  One was the idea that a reasonable person obeys the law.76  
The other was the need for courts to show proper respect for an-
other branch of government.77  The legislature acts to set safety 
standards and condemn dangerous activities in view of changing 
conditions.78  A jury could not properly determine that a defend-
ant reasonably substituted his own judgment for the legislature’s 
on how to act, especially when the conduct that caused harm 
proved the legislature’s judgment was correct.79 
The early law construed the idea of the legislature broadly80 
but tied negligence-per-se liability to the legislative body’s intent.  
Only statutory violations that caused the harm the legislature 
74. Thayer, supra note 12, at 322-23.
75. Id. at 320.
76. Id. at 323-24.
77. Id. at 324 (“[A]pproval of the wrongdoer’s conduct by the court is not consistent
with proper respect for another branch of the government.”). 
78. See id. at 326-28.
79. Thayer, supra note 12, at 323.  Lowndes responded that Thayer erroneously as-
sumed that the legislature decided how a prudent person would act.  Lowndes, supra note 
12, at 368.  He said that a court should not find a person negligent for failing to comply with 
an absolute rule of law instead of a standard that a jury found appropriate in the particular 
case.  Id. at 376.   
80. The early treatises generally equated state statutes and municipal ordinances in 
applying negligence per se.  The Shearman & Redfield 1898 treatise, for example, captioned 
its discussion of negligence per se “Violation of duty imposed by statute or ordinance,” 
equating violations of statutes and “valid municipal regulation[s].”  1 SHEARMAN & 
REDFIELD, supra note 40, § 13.  This treatise cited cases such as the 1893 decision in Mueller 
v. Milwaukee St. Ry. Co., 56 N.W. 914 (Wis. 1893), which said that proof that a car ob-
structed the street in violation of a city penal ordinance was proof of negligence.  Id. at 915.
In some cases, however, the ordinances at issue provided that violators would be liable for
harm caused by that violation.  See Toledo, Peoria and Warsaw Ry. Co. v. Deacon, 63 Ill.
91, 94 (1872) (discussing ordinance regulating the speed of trains).
Thayer and Malburn also debated the question of which lawmaking bodies quali-
fied as legislative, specifically whether violations of municipal ordinances properly imposed 
negligence-per-se liability.  Malburn criticized the courts’ failure to distinguish statutes and 
ordinances, arguing that state legislatures could not delegate their power to make laws re-
garding negligence to municipalities.  Malburn, supra note 12, at 219-20.  Thayer, however, 
argued that violations of ordinances and statutes should receive the same treatment because, 
in both cases, the state had spoken through a legislative body that had the authority to regu-
late the matter.  Thayer, supra note 12, at 324.   
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aimed to prevent led to negligence-per-se liability.81  The most 
influential case establishing this limit was a British case, Gorris 
v. Scott, which found that a violation of a law requiring that ani-
mals shipped at sea be confined in separate pens did not impose
negligence-per-se liability when the animals were swept over-
board in a storm.82  There was no liability because the purpose of
the statute was to protect against disease, not the hazards of the
seas.83
The same rule applied in the United States.  In Boronkay v. 
Robinson & Carpenter, for instance, the New York Court of Ap-
peals found that the defendant, who violated a statute that re-
quired drivers to park vehicles with their right sides to the curb, 
was not per se negligent even though the violation led to a child’s 
death.84  The court found the statutory violation irrelevant to the 
question of liability.85  The purpose of the statute was to aid the 
safe passage of vehicles and individuals using the road; the injury 
was not connected to the violation.86 
The logical effect of these cases was to reject the theory that 
individuals who violated statutes were outlaws, refusing to em-
brace the full implications of a doctrine that would hold any indi-
vidual who violated a statute per se liable in tort.87  These cases 
allowed some individuals whose statutory violations caused harm 
81. See Lowndes, supra note 12, at 373 (discussing Gorris v. Scott (1874) 9 LR Exch.
125 (Eng.), and Boronkay v. Robinson & Carpenter, 160 N.E. 400 (N.Y. 1928)); see also 1 
SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 40, § 13, at 11-13.  
82. Gorris, 9 LR Exch. at 128-30.
83. Id. at 129-30.
84. Boronkay, 160 N.E. at 400-01 (explaining that a hook hanging down the left side 
of the truck hit and killed a child when the truck started). 
85. Id. at 400 (ruling that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that it could 
find the defendant negligent if it found a violation of the traffic law). 
86. The court explained that disregard of a statute is a breach of duty to those for 
whose protection the statute’s safeguards existed but that there was no breach of duty toward 
individuals who were not in the “zone of apprehended danger” even in cases “where a stat-
utory command is not obeyed.”  Id. at 400-01. 
87. See cases cited supra note 54.  A case like White v. Levarn, 108 A. 564 (Vt. 1918), 
would come out differently if the court rejected the outlaw theory.  That case found a person 
who violated a law prohibiting hunting on Sundays negligent per se and liable to a fellow 
hunter whom he accidentally shot.  Id.  It is safe to assume that the legislature did not enact 
the law out of fear that there were special risks inherent in hunting on any particular day of 
the week and that the harm the actor caused was not the harm the legislature aimed to prevent.  
Similarly, a statute prohibiting animal cruelty is concerned with preventing harm to animals, 
not with preventing incidental injury to bystanders.  See Osborne v. Van Dyke, 85 N.W. 784, 
785-86 (Iowa 1901) (imposing liability who accidently struck another person with a blow
meant for his horse).
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to escape negligence-per-se liability, undermining the notion that 
the rationale for the doctrine was to penalize wrongdoers.  The 
reason the legislature acted would be irrelevant if negligence per 
se was a penalty for wrongdoing; the individual would have still 
violated the statute, no matter what its purpose.  Legislative intent 
was key.  The courts, however, assumed that legislative bodies 
intended negligence per se. 
II. DIFFERENT PATHS: VIOLATIONS OF LAW AND
CUSTOM IN THE MODERN ERA 
The law of negligence per se had evolved considerably by 
the 1930s.  Cases and secondary authority had limited the doctrine 
to acts that violated enacted law, although there was no explicit 
explanation of the reasons for the restriction.  There was also no 
clear reasoning that supported the use of the doctrine at all.  The 
effect of the cases, though, was to reject the idea that negligence 
per se served to penalize wrongdoers and to focus instead on hon-
oring legislative intent.  The law had developed an expansive 
view of negligence per se that took tort cases out of the jury’s 
hands when a statutory violation was in play without any clear 
explanation of why, or whether, it was proper to do so. 
A. Negligence Per Se from the First Restatement to the
Present
The First Restatement of Torts codified the law as it had 
evolved, limiting negligence per se to violations of enacted law.  
It followed the lead of the commentary and treatises by providing 
that a person who violated a legal standard was negligent.88  The 
Restatement did not use the term “negligence per se” or explain 
the justification for the doctrine or its reach,89 but codified the 
doctrine in its then-current form.   
The First Restatement adopted the doctrine of negligence per 
se as it had evolved.  The Restatement provided that an individual 
who violated “a legislative enactment” faced liability if four cri-
teria were met: (a) “the intent of the enactment” was to protect the 
88. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 286 (AM. LAW INST. 1934).
89. Neither the provisions discussing the legal consequences of statutory violations
nor the commentary use the term “negligence per se.”  Id.  
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other’s individual interests; (b) “the interest invaded” was one 
which the enactment was “intended to protect”; (c) the violation 
resulted from the hazard against which the enactment aimed to 
protect; and (d) the violation was “a legal cause of the invasion.”90  
The Restatement followed the accepted law by tying the doctrine 
to legislative intent, although the commentary did not explain the 
provision in those terms.  The doctrine applied if the violation 
injured the individual interests of a person whom the legislature 
aimed to protect against the harm the legislature aimed to pre-
vent.91  The Restatement also broadly interpreted the idea of leg-
islative action by equating municipalities with state legislatures.92 
The Restatement did not discuss the negligence-per-se doc-
trine’s origins in cases dealing with custom and common law 
rules, but it treated negligence per se as a component of the 
broader question of how to determine the standard of reasonable 
conduct.  The Restatement took an expansive view of the trial 
judge’s role in determining what was reasonable.  It said that ei-
ther a “legislative enactment or a judicial decision” could deter-
mine the “standard of conduct of a reasonable man.”93  The trial 
judge or jury would look at the facts of a case and determine what 
was reasonable in the absence of a legislative enactment or judi-
cial decision.94 
90. Id.  The provision also required that the injured person not act in a way that pre-
cluded him from bringing a claim.  Id.  A related provision stated that a violation of “a leg-
islative enactment” would not create civil liability if the provision were designed to protect 
municipal interests or to secure rights to which a person was entitled only as a member of 
the public.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 288 (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
91. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 286.  See also id. cmts. e-h.  The Restatement
relied on Gorris to support this limitation.  Id. cmt. h, illus. 4. 
92. The provision on negligence per se referred to violations of a “legislative enact-
ment,” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 286, but the comments referred to a “statute or 
ordinance.”  Id. cmts. b & c.  The illustrations and commentary accompanying the provision 
explaining when violations of legislative enactments would not impose liability also dealt 
with both statutes and municipal ordinances.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS  § 288 illus. 
& cmts. on cls. (a)-(c).  The illustrations and comments also equated state and federal law.  
See id. illus. 4 (referring to act of Congress requiring that railroads equip cars with automatic 
couplers); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 285 cmt. B (AM. LAW INST. 1934) (saying 
that the enactment of a commission or municipality with power to create a standard of con-
duct has the same force as a statute a state or Congress enacted).  
93. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 285.
94. Id.
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The Restatement commentary explained that legislative en-
actments could conclusively establish the standard of conduct.95  
A legislative decision to prohibit an act in order to protect the in-
terests of others defined the standard of conduct of a reasonable 
person.96  Appellate decisions could also establish that conduct 
was negligent and take the issue out of the jury’s hands.97  Custom 
could also give rise to a standard of conduct.  “Occasionally a 
situation occurs so often that a series of appellate decisions deals 
with so much of the customary conduct of both parties as to afford 
a fairly exhaustive definition of the conduct of reasonable men in 
such situations.”98 
The First Restatement took a narrow view overall of the 
jury’s role in negligence cases.  A trial judge could determine that 
a jury could not reasonably find the defendant negligent and with-
draw a case from the jury absent a legislative enactment or appel-
late decision.99  The jury would define reasonable conduct if no 
legislative enactment established a “standard of obligatory con-
duct” and “there is no ruling of an appellate court upon substan-
tially identical situations and the trial court has not withdrawn the 
case from the jury . . . .”100 
The First Restatement’s support for judicially-imposed rules 
of conduct was out of step with the developing case law, however, 
as judicial decisions had begun to argue against judicial imposi-
tion of rules of conduct.101  A famous example is Justice 
Cardozo’s opinion in Pokora v. Wabash Railway Company,102 
which determined that a driver who did not leave his truck and 
95. Id. cmt. b.  The Restatement, however, only discussed the significance of a per-
son’s failure to comply with a legislative enactment; it did not discuss the significance of 
compliance with a statutory standard.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (AM. 
LAW INST. 1966). 
96. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 285 cmt. h (referring to section 286).
97. Id. cmt. d.
98. Id. The Restatement did not, however, have a section on custom.
99. Id. § 285 cmt. e.
100. Id. cmt. f.
101.  As Professor James wrote in 1949, “the tendency has been away from fixed stand-
ards and towards enlarging the sphere of the jury.”  Fleming James, Functions of Judge and 
Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667, 678 (1949); see also Kotler, supra note 45, at 
73-74 (discussing shift in judicial decision making from making rules to articulating stand-
ards); Leonard, supra note 4, at 454-56 (discussing problems with attempting to apply fixed
standards in tort cases).
102. 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
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survey a railroad crossing before proceeding was not contributo-
rily negligent as a matter of law.103  The opinion noted a division 
of authority on the issue104 and rejected Justice Holmes’s earlier 
opinion that those precautions were a legal requirement.105  Jus-
tice Holmes had stated that a driver who did not take such 
measures was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.106  He 
explained that, although “the question of due care very generally 
is left to the jury,” a clear standard of conduct “should be laid 
down once for all by the Courts.”107  Justice Cardozo responded 
that there was a “need for caution in framing standards of behav-
ior that amount to rules of law.”108  The variety of circumstances 
in any given situation meant that standards suitable for the aver-
age case might not apply in a specific situation.109  The question 
of negligence was for the jury.110 
Cases such as Pokora reflected a broader role for juries in 
negligence cases than did the First Restatement, but the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts (“Second Restatement”) did not address 
that change.111  Rather, provisions on negligence per se in the Sec-
ond Restatement, like the First Restatement, followed a general 
provision on how courts could determine the standard of con-
duct.112  The Restatement provision gave four options for deter-
mining “[t]he standard of conduct of a reasonable man.”113  A 
legislative enactment or administrative regulation could explicitly 
103. See id. at 101.  The driver was hit by a train.  Id. at 100.
104. Id. at 103 (citing cases from Pennsylvania that imposed a duty to stop and cases 
from New York, Arkansas, Illinois, and Connecticut which said the question was for the 
jury). 
105. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927); see also 
Pokora, 292 U.S. at 106 (limiting the opinion). 
106. Goodman, 275 U.S. at 70.
107. Id.
108. Pokora, 292 U.S. at 105.
109. Id. at 105-06.
110. Id. at 106; see generally KEETON, supra note 14, § 35, at 217-18 (discussing the 
cases and noting that absolute rules of conduct “broke[] down in face of the necessity” of 
looking at the circumstances of individual situations); Kotler, supra note 45, at 73-74 (dis-
cussing the cases). 
111. The Third Restatement, however, addressed these cases in discussing the jury’s
role in negligence cases.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 8 reporters’ note cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010); see infra text accom-
panying note 144. 
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
113. Id.
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set the standard, the court could adopt the standard “from a legis-
lative enactment or an administrative regulation which does not 
so provide,” judicial decisions could set the standard, or the trial 
judge or jury could determine a standard in light of the facts of a 
case “if there is no such enactment, regulation, or decision.”114 
Although the structure and phrasing of this provision dif-
fered somewhat from its counterpart in the First Restatement,115 
the Second Restatement’s commentary was virtually identical to 
that of the First.  For example, the Second Restatement contained 
the same general comment that a jury determines reasonableness 
in the absence of a legislative enactment and the appellate court 
ruled on the situation and the trial court did not withdraw the case 
from the jury.116  It also addressed the relevance of custom in 
identical language, stating that appellate decisions can deal with 
“so much of the customary conduct of both parties as to afford a 
fairly exhaustive definition of the conduct of reasonable men in 
such situations.”117 
The Second Restatement’s substantive provisions on negli-
gence per se also closely mirrored those in the First Restatement, 
and limited the doctrine in much the same way.118  The Second 
Restatement provided that a court could adopt statutory require-
ments as the reasonable person’s standard of conduct when the 
legislature intended to serve four purposes.119  The legislature 
must have intended to protect: (a) “a class of persons which in-
cludes the one whose interest is invaded,” and (b) “the particular 
114. Id.
115. Compare id. with RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 285 (AM. LAW INST.
1934); see supra text accompanying notes 90-95.  The First Restatement contained one pro-
vision referring to legislative enactments or judicial decisions and one addressing the role of 
the trial judge or jury.  The Second had more divisions.  One section referred to legislative 
standards or administrative regulations which expressly set a standard, one to legislation or 
regulations which did not expressly set a standard, the third to judicial decisions, and the 
fourth to the trial judge or jury.  The Second Restatement also added sections outlining the 
roles of judge and jury in negligence cases.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 
328B, 328C (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  The court was to determine if the defendant owed a 
legal duty, § 328B(b), the standard of conduct the legal duty required, § 328B(c), and 
“whether the defendant . . .  conformed to that standard, in any cases in which the jury may 
not reasonably come to a different conclusion,” § 328B(d). 
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
117. Id. cmt. e.
118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  The title 
of the provision is “When Standard of Conduct Defined by Legislation or Regulation Will 
Be Adopted,” and the provision does not use the term negligence per se.  See id.   
119. Id.
68 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  71:1 
interest which is invaded,” against (c) “the kind of harm which 
has resulted,” and (d) “the particular hazard from which the harm 
results.”120  An additional provision made it clear that a violation 
of such a standard was negligence per se.  “The unexcused viola-
tion of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation 
which is adopted by the court as defining the standard of conduct 
of a reasonable man, is negligence in itself.”121  The commentary 
explained that the provision meant “that the violation becomes 
conclusive on the issue of the actor’s departure from the standard 
of conduct required of a reasonable man, and so, without more, is 
negligence.”122 
The Second Restatement expanded the body of law impos-
ing negligence-per-se liability by including violations of admin-
istrative regulations.123  Treatises began to address liability for vi-
olations of rules and regulations as those sources of law became 
increasingly important.124  Clarence Morris, one of the leading 
120. Id.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  The com-
ment to this section used the term negligence per se.  “Usually it is said that such a violation 
is negligence ‘per se,’ or in itself.”  Id. cmt. a. 
122. Id. cmt. b.
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (stating that a court could adopt the 
standards of a legislative enactment or administrative regulation as the standard of reasona-
bleness).  The Second Restatement continued to address the significance of a violation of 
federal law only in passing.  Commentary on the effect of a violation of an administrative 
regulation referred to the likelihood that a violation of an Interstate Commerce Commission 
regulation would be negligence per se.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B cmt. d. 
The comment stated that courts consider the “character and importance” of the administrative 
body issuing a regulation as a relevant factor in determining whether a violation of a regula-
tion was negligence per se, making it more likely that a court would accord negligence-per-
se significance to a violation of an Interstate Commerce Commission regulation than to one 
of a city fire commission. Id.  Each case the reporter’s notes cited as authority for the prop-
osition that violation of a regulation could be negligence per se referred to violations of state 
agency regulations, however.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288 reporter’s notes 
(AM. LAW INST. 1966).  In the one case that involved a federal regulation, the defendant was 
liable for violating a federal regulation which the state agency required it to follow.  See 
Rinehart v. Woodford Flying Serv., Inc., 9 S.E.2d 521, 522-23 (W. Va. 1940).  As in the 
First Restatement, the Second Restatement’s comment on when a case would not go to a jury 
referred to a standard set by an act of Congress.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also supra note 95. 
124. For example, the 1941 revised edition of the Shearman & Redfield negligence 
treatise contained a section entitled “Rules and regulations,” and noted that violation of ad-
ministrative regulations was “some evidence” of negligence.  1 THOMAS G. SHEARMAN & 
AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 18, at 40 (Clarence S. 
Zipp ed., rev. ed. 1941) (citing predominately cases from New York, a state that has never 
equated statutes and administrative regulations for negligence-per-se purposes).  On the in-
creasing importance of regulations, see 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 
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scholars in the area,125 argued that regulations generally “are de-
serving of respect as criteria of fault.”126  He explained that ad-
ministrators are presumably experts who regulate in areas in 
which legislators cannot act adequately.127  The legislature’s def-
erence to agencies and agencies’ expertise led Morris to conclude 
that administrative safety measures, like legislative dictates, are 
generally “deserving of respect as criteria of fault.”128 
Professor Morris’s reference to expertise suggested a new 
rationale in support of negligence per se.  The idea that a court 
should defer to a body with expertise in a complex area comple-
mented legislative comity as the basis for finding violations of 
regulations negligence per se.  Some influential negligence-per-
se cases relied on this idea in considering legislative enactments.  
The Texas case of Rudes v. Gottschalk,129 a case on which the 
Second Restatement’s Reporter’s Notes relied,130 explained that 
courts adopt legislative standards because a legislative body is 
generally better suited than a court to establish standards “by rea-
son of its organization and investigating processes.”131 
The Second Restatement also addressed two matters that the 
First Restatement did not.  First, it discussed when a violation of 
law would be excused, noting that “[a]n excused violation of a 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 1.3-1.5 (3d ed. 1994); Morris, The Relation of Criminal 
Statutes, supra note 12, at 453. 
125. See supra note 12 (citing Morris’s other negligence per se articles); Leonard,
supra note 4, at 427 (citing Morris as a leading scholar). 
126. Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures, supra note 12, at 144.
127. See id.  Professor Morris relied on a similar idea to justify treating violations of 
criminal statutes as negligence per se.  Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes, supra note 12, 
at 47 (explaining that legislatures have better opportunities to arrive at informed judgments 
than do judges and jurors because of their ability to gather facts, hold hearings, and debate 
the issues). 
128. Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures, supra note 12, at 144.  Such 
respect was due absent “any special reason for suspecting the soundness or impartiality of 
administrative safety measures.”  Id. 
129. 324 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tex. 1959).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 reporter’s notes (AM. LAW INST.
1966). 
131. Rudes, 324 S.W.2d at 204.  See also Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal
Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1137 n.61 (1988) 
(stating that Rudes supports the argument that expertise justifies negligence per se).  The 
Reporters relied on Rudes to support the idea that courts were under no obligation to find 
that statutory requirements governed in a negligence action unless the legislature so stated, 
however.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 reporters’ notes (AM. LAW INST. 
1966). 
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legislative enactment . . . is not negligence.”132  It provided a list 
of situations that would excuse violations, such as cases when the 
defendant labored under an incapacity or when the defendant 
acted in an emergency.133  The comment stated that the list of ex-
cuses was not exclusive.134 
The Second Restatement also addressed compliance with 
legislation.  It stated that compliance with a statute or administra-
tive regulation did “not prevent a finding of negligence where a 
reasonable man would take additional precautions.”135  The com-
ment explained that legislative standards were normally mini-
mum standards of conduct designed with reference to ordinary 
conditions; the existence of those standards did not preclude a 
finding that a reasonable person would sometimes take additional 
precautions.136  A jury or “court as a matter of law” could accept 
the legislative standard absent special circumstances, but those 
standards did not preclude a finding that a reasonable person 
would sometimes take additional precautions.137 
The Third Restatement addresses negligence per se against 
a backdrop that recognizes a broader role for the jury than did the 
previous Restatements.138  The Third Restatement provides that 
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  The re-
porter’s notes explained that this section was added to the First Restatement, which men-
tioned the matter briefly in a comment.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A report-
ers’ notes (AM. LAW INST. 1966).  That comment, which addressed the interpretation of 
statutes, said that violation of a statute would not create civil liability unless done under 
circumstances that would make the violation criminally punishable.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) 
OF TORTS § 286 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A.  Other excuses were the failure 
to know of the occasion for compliance, inability to comply using due care, and that compli-
ance would involve a greater risk of harm than noncompliance.  Id.  
134. See id. cmt. a.
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
136. Id. cmt. a.
137. Id.  The decision in Josephson v. Meyers, 429 A.2d 877 (Conn. 1980), discusses
this idea.  The court relied on the Second Restatement in explaining that compliance with 
statutory standards does not preclude a finding of negligence, but “where the facts are similar 
to those contemplated by the statute and no special or unusual circumstances or dangers are 
present, a defendant satisfies his duty of care by complying with the statute.”  Id. at 880-81.  
In practice, this principle allows courts to find that compliance with a statute precludes a 
finding of negligence as a matter of law.  See Leisy v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 40 N.W.2d 626, 630 
(Minn. 1950) (finding that compliance with a statute mandates a conclusion that defendant 
was not negligent as a matter of law when no special circumstances were present). 
138. The commentary, however, states that the Restatement does not intend a major
change, saying that it “largely agrees with and draws on” sections 328A-328B of the Second 
Restatement.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
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the jury’s role is to determine the facts and whether a party exer-
cised due care when reasonable minds could differ.139  The Third 
Restatement, unlike its predecessors, contains no provision indi-
cating that judicial decisions can state the standard of care.140  The 
commentary explains that courts had increasingly refused to take 
the question of what is appropriate conduct away from the jury.141  
What appears to be a recurring issue may, upon closer inspection, 
reveal many variables meriting individual determination.142  The 
commentary explains that, “[t]ort law has thus accepted an ethics 
of particularism” that doubts that general rules can produce deter-
minate results, and “which requires that actual moral judgments 
be based on the circumstances of each individual situation.”143  
Tort law’s need for individualized decisions “highlights the pri-
mary role necessarily fulfilled by the jury.”144 
The Third Restatement’s focus on the idea of particularism 
seems in tension with the doctrine of negligence per se, which 
rejects the notion that a jury can decide whether an individual who 
violated a legislative provision was negligent.  The Third Restate-
ment firmly embraces the doctrine of negligence per se, however, 
and rejects the idea of particularism where legal provisions are 
involved.  Not only does it fully adopt the principles of negligence 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 8 reporters’ note cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010); see supra text accom-
panying notes 115-20 (discussing the Second Restatement).   
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 8 cmt. c, reporters’ note cmt. c. 
140. See supra text accompanying note 97 (discussing First Restatement); see supra 
text accompanying note 117 (discussing Second Restatement). 
141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 8 cmt. c.  The comment notes that there can be advantages in taking recurring ques-
tions away from the jury: reducing litigation costs in later cases, avoiding different outcomes 
in similar cases, and giving individuals guidance on what conduct will avoid liability.  Id.  
American courts, however, have generally decided that the advantages of allowing courts to 
decide these issues do not justify taking cases from a jury.  Id.  The reporters’ note to this 
comment discusses the dispute between Justices Holmes and Cardozo in applying this prin-
ciple to railway crossing cases.  Id. reporters’ note cmt. c; see supra text accompanying notes 
103-11 (discussing the cases).
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 8 cmt. c. 
143. Id.
144. Id.
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per se, but it broadens the class of violations that can impose neg-
ligence-per-se liability and narrows the category of excuses for 
violating the law.145 
The Third Restatement articulates the same basic principle 
of negligence per se as did the Second Restatement, but simplifies 
the formulation of the doctrine.146  The provision simply states: 
“An actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor violates a stat-
ute that is designed to protect against the type of accident the ac-
tor’s conduct causes, and if the accident victim is within the class 
of persons the statute is designed to protect.”147  This doctrine of 
negligence per se is the rule in the “strong majority” of jurisdic-
tions.148 
The commentary accompanying the Third Restatement goes 
further than previous Restatements in justifying the doctrine.149  
Chief among the reasons it gives for negligence per se is defer-
ence to legislative judgment.  First, it would be “awkward,” as a 
matter of “institutional comity,” for a court to find that conduct a 
legislature prohibited was reasonable.150  Second, although juries 
generally serve as the community’s voice in determining whether 
conduct was negligent, “the judgment of the legislature, as the 
authoritative representative of the community,” should prevail 
over a jury’s view when the legislature has decided what conduct 
145. See infra text accompanying notes 162-63 (expanding scope of violations) & 
166-71 (excuses).  The Restatement notes that the significance of negligence per se has ex-
panded over the years.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2010); infra text accompanying notes 164-
65.
146. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 14.  It also explicitly uses the term “negligence per se” in describing 
the doctrine, unlike the previous restatements.  The heading to the section is “Statutory Vio-
lations as Negligence Per Se.”  Id. 
147. Id.
148. Id. reporters’ note cmt. c.  The comment cites cases from four states that hold 
that a statutory violation “creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence, or prima facie 
proof of negligence.”  Id.  The Reporters explain that this view is very similar to the Restate-
ment approach, which allows a showing of excuse to rebut a presumption that the actor was 
negligent per se.  Id. (citing id. § 15).  Approximately a dozen states provide that a statutory 
violation “is only some evidence of negligence.”  Id. 
149. Id. cmt. c.  The comment defends the doctrine, stating: “[C]ourts, exercising their
common-law authority to develop tort doctrine, not only should regard the actor’s statutory 
violation as evidence admissible against the actor, but should treat that violation as actually 
determining the actor’s negligence.”  Id. 
150. Id.
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is appropriate.151  Third, it can be problematic to apply a negli-
gence standard to “problems of recurring conduct” because the 
uncertainty of a jury verdict can lead to inequality and high liti-
gation costs.152  Statutes generally address recurring conduct, so 
negligence per se “replaces decision making by juries in catego-
ries of cases where the operation of the latter may be least satis-
factory.”153  The Restatement does not, however, discuss how to 
square this view with the move toward particularism when statu-
tory violations are not present. 
The Third Restatement emphasizes that limitations on the 
reach of the doctrine remain in force.  “Negligence per se applies 
only when the accident that injures the plaintiff is the type of ac-
cident that the statute seeks to avert.”154  The doctrine does not 
apply when the statute “is not a safety statute at all.”155  Similarly, 
the doctrine applies only if the plaintiff is in the class of persons 
the legislature sought to protect.156  The limits on the doctrine re-
veal that it serves to substitute the legislature’s judgment on what 
conduct is safe in a particular situation for a jury’s.157 
Despite the focus on legislative deference, the Third Restate-
ment treats the concept of legislation broadly.  Violations of ad-
ministrative regulations are generally negligence per se.158  The 
151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 14. 
152. Id.  The commentary, however, does not refer back to the comments to section 
eight of the Restatement, dealing with the jury’s role, which had argued that similar concerns 
did not justify allowing judge-made rules to take cases out of the jury’s hands.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 142-48.  The Restatement thus ignores the tension between the 
sections.  
153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 14 cmt. c.  The comment also notes that negligence per se has long been established 
as the default as to how courts assess statutory violations, meaning it could be assumed that 
legislatures intended that result.  Id. 
154. Id. cmt. f.
155. Id.  The comment states that the legislation does not have to aim only to promote 
safety.  It is enough that avoiding the type of accident at issue is one of the statute’s objec-
tives.  Id. 
156. Id. cmt. g.  The comment notes that this analysis generally adds little to the 
legislative purpose analysis.  Id. 
157. In other words, the doctrine does not exist to penalize outlaws for their miscon-
duct.  See 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 54, § 17.6, at 617-18 (stating that the notion that a 
person who violates a statute should be held liable for any injury has “little currency”); supra 
text accompanying notes 48-50.   
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 14 cmt. a.  Indeed, “[m]ost states that accept negligence per se apply it to violations 
of administrative regulations.”  Id. reporters’ note cmt. a. 
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commentary notes that although negligence per se usually applies 
to state legislative enactments, it “equally applies to regulations 
adopted by state administrative bodies, ordinances adopted by lo-
cal councils, and federal statutes as well as regulations promul-
gated by federal agencies.”159  The expanded sources of law that 
can lead to negligence-per-se liability, and the scope of statutory 
and regulatory controls on everyday life, make the doctrine far-
reaching.160  The Restatement notes that the significance of neg-
ligence per se “has expanded in recent decades.”161 
The Third Restatement also expanded the reach of negli-
gence per se by narrowing the excuses for violating the law.  Like 
the Second Restatement, the Third contains a section on excused 
violations.162  The provision recognizes essentially the same ex-
cuses as the Second—incapacity, reasonable attempts at compli-
ance, inability to know of the statute’s applicability, and the dan-
ger of compliance.163  The commentary, however, takes a much 
stricter view to interpreting permissible excuses.  The commen-
tary does not begin with a general statement that the list is not 
exclusive, as did the Second Restatement.164  Instead, the back-
ground comment says it is “essential” to “elaborate the relevant 
categories of excuses.”165  The commentary also explains what 
circumstances do not count as excuses.  These explicit exceptions 
159. Id. cmt. a.  This is the first Restatement explicitly to equate state and federal law 
for the purposes of negligence-per-se analysis. 
160. See id. cmt. d.
161. Id.
162. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM  § 15 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).  Excused violations of a statute are not negligence per 
se.  Id.  The comment to this section explains that recognizing excuses prevents application 
of the negligence-per-se doctrine in many cases in which public officials would decide not 
to prosecute a technical violation of the law.  Id. cmt. a. 
163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 15. 
164. The last comment addresses additional excuses.  It states that there may be ad-
ditional excuses worthy of recognition “[a]lthough the absence of cases reduces the likeli-
hood of this.”  Id. cmt. g.  For discussion of the Second Restatement’s provision on excused 
violations, see supra text accompanying notes 132-37. 
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 15 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 2010). 
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are a sincere or reasonable belief that the statute is unwise, igno-
rance of the law, and custom.166  “[N]or is it an excuse if there is 
a custom to depart from the statutory requirement.”167 
The Third Restatement also addresses statutory compliance.  
It follows the Second Restatement in providing that compliance 
with a statute, although evidence of non-negligent conduct, does 
not preclude a finding of negligence.168  The commentary, to 
some extent, echoes the policies that underlie the law of negli-
gence per se, and casts the justification for the rule in terms of 
legislative deference.  A finding that a motorist is negligent if he 
travels the speed limit in adverse conditions is consistent with leg-
islative judgment because a speed limit logically sets minimum 
safety standards and looks to general circumstances.169  A court 
can, however, direct a finding that a person who complies with a 
statute is not negligent when there are no unusual circumstances 
present.170  The provision that a person is not negligent in failing 
to take precautions that violate a statute rests on respect for the 
rule of law.171 
Other explanations for the compliance rule, however, look 
more to the law of custom.  The commentary explicitly links the 
rule regarding compliance with statutes with the Restatement’s 
provision on custom, which says that compliance with custom is 
evidence of non-negligent conduct, but not determinative.172  
Similar concerns underlie both.  The rule concerning custom rests 
on the concern that self-interest may lead individuals to take in-
adequate safety precautions.173  The rule regarding compliance 
166. Id.
167. Id.  For criticism of the Third Restatement’s approach to excused violations, and 
an argument that judges should have a broader role in determining when the doctrine applies, 
see Twerski, supra note 12, at 1000-03; infra text accompanying notes 415-16 & 433-37. 
168. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 16 (AM. LAW. INST. 2010).  It also provides that an individual does not need to 
adopt precautions that would violate a statute, id., and recognizes that a statute may provide 
that compliance is a defense to liability.  Id. cmt. a.  The reference to statutes also includes 
ordinances and administrative regulations.  Id.  For discussion of the comparable Second 
Restatement provision, see supra text accompanying notes 135-37. 
169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 16 cmt. e. 
170. Id. cmt. f.
171. Id. cmt. g.
172. Id. cmt. b (citing the Restatement provision on compliance with custom, section 
13). 
173. Id.
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with statutes similarly evidences a concern that the lawmaking 
process can “be insufficiently attentive to the interests of potential 
victims.”174 
The Third Restatement, then, reflects a somewhat ambiva-
lent view of positive law.  On the one hand, any positive law pro-
hibiting an action renders a person per se negligent, even when 
the custom is to violate that law.  At the same time, the Restate-
ment recognizes that general rules may not adequately account 
for specific cases and that legislative safety judgments may not 
adequately take all relevant interests into account.  Despite these 
concerns, the Restatement’s view of negligence per se dictates 
that the violation of statutory standards takes the negligence de-
cision out of a jury’s hands, no matter how ill-suited the statute to 
govern the particular situation.175 
The application of negligence per se is powerful.  Standard 
negligence-per-se jury instructions do not allow a jury to exercise 
judgment—they tell the jury that a defendant who violated a stat-
ute is liable.176  New York’s standard jury instruction states 
bluntly: “If you find that defendant violated the statute, and if that 
violation was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury . . . 
, then defendant is liable.”177  Negligence per se is a stark excep-
tion to the general rule that juries decide whether a person has 
acted reasonably.178 
174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 16 cmt. b.  The reporters’ note to comment b relies on Schwartz, supra note 131, to 
support this view.  Schwartz argues that the regulatory process is inadequate to provide max-
imum safety standards because regulated industries heavily influence the regulatory process 
and regulation moves too slowly to keep standards up to date.  Id. at 1146-60. 
175. Although violations can be excused, the Third Restatement limits permissible 
excuses and those excuses are narrow and do not include a judgment that the statute is out-
dated or ill-suited to govern the situation.  See supra text accompanying notes 162-67.  
176. See, e.g., 1 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § CV 401.01 (2018) (“A person may be 
required by law to do something or not to do something.  Failure to do what is required by 
law is negligence, as is doing something the law prohibits.”); PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD 
CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 13.100 (4th ed. 2013) (“If you find that [name of defendant]
violated this law, you must find that [name of defendant] was negligent.”).
177. N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIV. § 2:25 (2017).
178. For a helpful discussion of this idea, see generally Twerski, supra note 12.  Pro-
fessor Twerski argues that “the law of negligence abhors generalizations” and is “fact sensi-
tive.”  Id. at 1005.  The law nonetheless embraces generalizations in the areas of negligence 
per se and res ipsa loquitur, despite the tension with the general approach.  He argues that 
the Third Restatement would be more effective and principled if it focused more on when to 
abandon generalizations and promoted a more fact-sensitive inquiry into the actor’s conduct. 
Id. at 997; see also Leonard, supra note 4, at 429 (arguing against the doctrine of negligence 
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B. Custom in the Modern Era
The doctrine of negligence per se had its roots in cases that 
enforced customs as rules of law and required a finding that a per-
son who violated a custom was negligent.179  These cases rested 
on the idea that a reasonable person would follow known safety 
precautions; it was unreasonable to neglect to take safety 
measures that were common and that, because they were com-
mon, were evidently feasible.180  The idea of reliance also played 
a role.  Individuals expected others to act in customary ways and 
relied on the assumption that they would do so.  It was unreason-
able for a person who dealt with others to deviate from customary 
modes of conduct because the expectation that others would take 
customary precautions dictated the precautions an individual took 
on his own behalf.181  These rationales for a judicial determination 
of negligence began to fall to the side as cases and commentary 
began to root negligence per se in enacted law and explain the 
doctrine in terms that applied uniquely to statutes.182  The ques-
tion of what legal consequences attended a failure to comply with 
customs never enacted into positive law faded into the back-
ground. 
The early tort treatises used the term negligence per se to 
describe cases dealing with statutory violations.183  Few discussed 
the legal consequences of a failure to conform to custom at any 
length, if at all.184  An early treatise on The Law of Usages and 
per se in part because it abandons the “judicial function . . . [and] traditional sphere of jury 
power” in negligence cases, effectively relinquishing the power of doctrinal development to 
the legislature). 
179. See supra Part I.A.
180. The cases holding that the failure to use automatic train couplers was negligence 
per se illustrate this logic.  See supra text accompanying notes 47-49. 
181. Simpson v. Hand, 6 Whart. 311, 323-24 (Pa. 1841), the first negligence per se 
case, used this logic.  See supra text accompanying notes 24-28. 
182. See supra text accompanying notes 55-62.  Custom, in modern usage, includes
standards issued by private organizations and government agency recommendations.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 
cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2010).  Early cases tended not to discuss private standards, largely 
because rules of evidence precluded their introduction.  See infra Part II.C. 
183. See supra text accompanying notes 61-71.
184. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Custom, Noncustomary Practice, and Negligence, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1784, 1795 (2009) (stating that custom only “became a fixture in the case-
books and treatises” after the publication of the Second Restatement). 
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Customs185 devoted only some fifteen pages to discussing the re-
lation of custom to negligence, essentially recounting cases that 
dealt with the topic but making few editorial observations.186  The 
only in-depth discussion of the topic was in one of the earliest 
treatises, William Hale’s 1896 Handbook on the Law of Torts.187  
Hale explained that the law looked to custom and usage in deter-
mining what was negligence.188  Custom and usage could 
“amount to almost positive law (as the law of the road, in the ab-
sence of statute),” to general business usage, or to the parties’ 
general practice.189  Hale noted that custom and usual care were 
not the same thing.  A person who exercised customary care did 
not necessarily exercise due diligence.190  A failure to comply 
with custom was different.  A person had to exercise care with 
reference to a usage or custom “which custom or usage may affect 
the probability of harm ensuing from a given course of con-
duct.”191  Due care, for instance, required following “the custom 
or law of the road.”192 
The later treatises, in the early part of the 1900s, devoted 
even less attention to deviation from custom and focused on the 
relevance of conformity with custom.  The supplement to Thomp-
son’s negligence treatise noted in 1914 that a custom would not 
justify a negligent act, but could “sometimes be considered by the 
185. LAWSON, supra note 69.
186. See id. §§ 168-177.
187. See HALE, supra note 69, § 231, at 454-67.
188. Id. at 464.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 465.  Hale later noted that evidence showing the plaintiff acted in accord-
ance with custom was not conclusive of an absence of negligence because the general usage 
could be negligent.  Id. at 487.  Custom was, however, admissible to show ordinary care.  Id. 
191. Id. at 465.
192. HALE, supra note 69, § 231, at 465.  Hale did not use the term negligence per se,
but he did note that it was “prima facie evidence of negligence” to leave a horse unhitched 
and unattended.  Id.   
Byron and William Elliott discussed nonconformity with custom in passing in 
their Treatise on The Law of Roads and Streets.  ELLIOTT & ELLIOTT, supra note 51, § 828.  
They referred to the “custom or system of rules regulating travel upon highways.”  Id.  There 
were statutes prescribing the law of the road in some states which were generally “simply 
the legislative enactments of what had already become a universal and established custom of 
our country.”  Id.  The commentators noted that courts would take judicial notice of some 
customs in the absence of statutes on the topic.  Id. § 830.  There was a presumption that a 
person who violated the law of the road was negligent.  Id. § 832. 
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jury on the issue of negligence.”193  In 1933, Harper noted that it 
was error to instruct a jury that a person who followed custom 
was not negligent.194  Even if a custom was reasonable in the ab-
stract, those actions might not be reasonable in a particular 
case.195 
The early custom cases generally dealt with compliance with 
custom; defendants argued that they acted reasonably because 
they followed customary precautions.196  The courts were split on 
the significance of compliance.197  Some cases treated compliance 
with custom as conclusive evidence of due care.  This rule, the 
“safe harbor rule,” found that business custom was the “unbend-
ing test of negligence.”198  The rival view was that compliance 
with custom was immaterial, and that evidence of custom was not 
even admissible.199  Neither competing view has current valid-
ity.200  The now-dominant custom rule, reflected in the famous 
case of The T.J. Hooper,201 is in many ways a middle ground.  It 
says that compliance with custom is relevant, but not determina-
tive.202  As Judge Learned Hand explained, “in most cases rea-
sonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is 
193. EDWARD F. WHITE, A SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF 
NEGLIGENCE OF SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, LL.D §§ 30, 31 (1914). 
194. HARPER, supra note 64, § 70, at 160.
195. Id.
196. See Abraham, supra note 184, at 1792.
197. Id; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and
History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1992) (exploring the law of 
custom).  
198. Abraham, supra note 184, at 1792; see also Titus v. Bradford, Bordell & Kinzua
R.R. Co., 20 A. 517, 518 (Pa. 1890); Henry R. Miller, Jr., The So-Called Unbending Test of 
Negligence, 3 VA. L. REV. 537, 537, 540-41 (1916) (arguing that the standard is unsound 
and criticizing the lack of flexibility and failure to consider individual facts and circum-
stances). 
199. Burke v. S. Boulder Canon Ditch Co., 203 P. 1098, 1099-1100 (Colo. 1922)
(holding that it was error to introduce evidence regarding the custom of constructing and 
operating ditches because the question is not what others have done, but what they ought to 
do).  
200. See Abraham, supra note 184, at 1793 (explaining that the modern treatment of
custom originated from the rejection of the rules that competed with it); Fleming James, Jr. 
& David K. Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of Conduct in Negligence Trials, 5 VAND. 
L. REV. 697, 710 (1952) (calling both views wrong on principle and largely abandoned).
201. 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
202. Id.  A number of well-known cases stated the same proposition. See, e.g., Tex.
& Pac. Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903) (“What usually is done may be evi-
dence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reason-
able prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.”); see also Abraham, supra note 
184, at 1792-94 (discussing development of the current rule). 
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never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the 
adoption of new and available devices.”203  Industry could not 
“set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages.”204  The de-
termination of what prudence required ultimately rested with the 
courts.205 
The early custom cases focused on the relevance of compli-
ance with custom, not on whether a defendant failed to exercise 
due care by omitting customary precautions.  As Professor Abra-
ham explains, one might have expected those courts that treated 
compliance with custom as the test of negligence to find that a 
departure from custom was negligence as a matter of law.206  They 
did not, however.  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that 
custom was the “unbending test” of negligence only “to disprove 
negligence, not to prove it.”207  Other courts followed suit.208  It 
does not appear, however, that courts that found custom as irrel-
evant to disproving negligence also found it to be irrelevant in 
determining what conduct was considered negligent.209 
The First Restatement of Torts did not address the topic of 
custom, perhaps because the rules regarding both compliance and 
departure from custom had just become accepted at the time it 
was published.210  Things changed when two major scholarly 
works, published after the First Restatement, focused on the topic 
and substantially influenced the law in this area.  The first was 
203. T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740.
204. Id.
205. Id.; see generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, at 194 (discussing the devel-
opment of the law of custom and saying that the view that custom was determinative proved 
“arbitrary” and “impossible to justify” because customs can be unreasonable in some situa-
tions and because some customs were the product of carelessness). 
206. See Abraham, supra note 184, at 1794.
207. Cunningham v. Fort Pitt Bridge Works, 47 A. 846, 846 (Pa. 1901); see Clarence 
Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1152 (1942) (discussing Cun-
ningham).  The Cunningham court’s approach is especially surprising because the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania decided the first negligence per se case, Simpson v. Hand, finding that 
deviation from custom was negligence per se.  See supra text accompanying 23-28.  The 
brief opinion in Cunningham does not cite Simpson. 
208. See Cent. Granaries Co. v. Ault, 107 N.W. 1015, 1016 (Neb. 1906) (using the 
same language as Cunningham); Abraham, supra note 184, at 1794. 
209. See Abraham, supra note 184, at 1794.
210. Id. at 1795.  The Second Restatement’s provision on custom notes that “this
Section has been added to the first Restatement.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
295A reporter’s notes (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
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Clarence Morris’s groundbreaking 1947 article, Custom and Neg-
ligence.211  Morris addressed both compliance with custom and 
departure from custom in detail.  He explained that evidence of 
conformity with custom was relevant for three reasons: (1) it 
showed that a finding of negligence would have implications for 
others’ conduct, (2) it focused attention on whether other 
measures were practical, and (3) it was relevant to the question of 
whether the defendant could have learned of other safeguards.212  
The value of the evidence was limited, however, and the evidence 
was not conclusive.213  Conformity with custom did not establish 
due care because an industry could continue to engage in an un-
safe practice.214 
Morris argued that evidence of departure from custom was 
more meaningful than that of conformity.  “Conformity evidence 
only raises questions, but sub-conformity evidence tends to an-
swer questions.”215  Emphasizing the need to distinguish sub-con-
formity from mere non-conformity,216  Morris explained that ev-
idence that the defendant used more dangerous methods than 
those customary in the craft was relevant in three ways: (1) it 
tended to show that liability would not force widespread change, 
(2) it suggested that safer methods than defendant’s were feasible,
and (3) it tended to show that the defendant carelessly failed to
learn of safeguards or consciously failed to take precautions that
others considered essential.217
Morris nonetheless argued that proof the defendant used less 
than customary care did not necessarily prove negligence.  The 
deviation could be insubstantial and reasonable, or the defend-
ant’s conduct could have been only slightly more dangerous than 
the custom.218  In many other cases, however, “the defendant is 
proved guilty of heedless, substantial sub-conformity to a usage 
211. Morris, supra note 207.
212. Id. at 1147-49.
213. Id. at 1149.
214. Id. at 1151.
215. Id. at 1161.
216. Morris, supra note 207, at 1152.  A person could act in a non-conforming manner
because he was ahead of his time or simply wanted to assert his individuality.  Id. 
217. Id. at 1151.
218. Id. at 1161-62.
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calling for reasonable, necessary safeguards.”219  Morris ex-
pressed surprise that there were virtually no such cases in which 
a court directed verdicts for plaintiffs.220  Drawing an analogy to 
negligence per se,221  Morris suggested there was “no reason why 
courts should relinquish their power to prevent unreasonable ver-
dicts” in such cases by finding that sub-conformity could never 
be conclusive proof of negligence.222 
Five years later, Fleming James and David Sigerson ad-
dressed similar concerns in their article focusing on the roles of 
judge and juries in establishing standards of conduct in negli-
gence trials.223  The article explained that a court impliedly deter-
mined the proper standard of conduct under the circumstances 
whenever it took the negligence issue from the jury.224  It did the 
same thing when it adopted the standard in a criminal statute in 
negligence per se cases, when it prescribed a standard based on 
custom, or when it articulated a rule to follow in recurring 
cases.225  The authors noted that courts generally refused to adopt 
mechanical rules limiting the jury’s role when asked to articulate 
standards.226  Applying this background to the specific question 
of custom, the authors explained that “the great weight of modern 
American authority” found that evidence of a custom to take or to 
omit a precaution was admissible on the question of what conduct 
was proper, but was not conclusive.227  The authors explained that 
219. Id. at 1162.
220. Id. (“I have not found one such case in which the court directed a verdict for the 
plaintiff!”).  Morris noted that it was possible there were directed verdicts that were not ap-
pealed, but thought that plaintiffs did not request directed verdicts.  Id. at 1162-63.  “Perhaps 
they confuse sub-conformity with conformity, and knowing that the latter is seldom conclu-
sive, assume that the former cannot be.”  Id. at 1163. 
221. Morris, supra note 207, at 1163 n.43 (citing to his article on negligence per se 
The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability). 
222. Id. at 1162-63.
223. James & Sigerson, supra note 200, at 697.
224. Id. at 704.  A court made this judgment when it held that a reasonable jury could
not find for or against negligence.  Id. 
225. See id.  The article discussed judicially-created rules such as the requirement that
drivers stop, look, and listen at railroad crossings and how the courts moved away from en-
forcing mechanical rules that limited the jury’s sphere.  See id. at 705-09; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 101-10 (discussing these cases and the change in judicial approach). 
226. James & Sigerson, supra note 200, at 708.
227. Id. at 710.
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evidence of custom had probative force because it represented the 
experience and conduct of many individuals.228 
The Second Restatement of Torts relied on Morris’s and 
James’ and Sigerson’s articles in addressing custom.229  The Re-
statement provision was brief, stating: “In determining whether 
conduct is negligent, the customs of the community, or others un-
der like circumstances, are factors to be taken into account, but 
are not controlling where a reasonable man would not follow 
them.”230 
The comments to the section do not go into detail and do not 
focus on differences between cases of compliance and noncom-
pliance with custom.  The comments explained that customs were 
relevant when they were so well-known that a party must be 
charged with knowing of the custom or with negligence in not 
knowing.231  Evidence of custom was relevant because customs 
cast light on the community’s judgment of the risks of a situation 
and what precautions were necessary to meet those risks.232; Cus-
tom also spoke to the feasibility of precautions, the difficulty of 
changing accepted methods of acting, the actor’s opportunity to 
228. Id. at 712.  The question of whether the jury determined the propriety of the 
defendant’s conduct or a judge set the standard was significant, Fleming and Sigerson ex-
plained, because the allocation of responsibility affected the likelihood that the defendant 
would be found liable.  See id. at 697.  They stated that rules expanding the jury’s role ex-
panded liability, while rules that fixed specific standards of conduct tended to narrow the 
jury’s role and restrict liability.  Id.  They cited two law review articles to support this con-
clusion: James, supra note 101, and Richard M. Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Auto-
mobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 476 (1936).   
It appears doubtful that this assumption is uniformly accurate, however.  Although 
it does appear logical that an instruction that a jury defer to custom as a measure of proper 
conduct would limit liability because a jury would not be able to look to other possible 
measures of care, the opposite seems true in cases of departure from custom.  A determina-
tion that customary precautions set a minimum standard would allow a judge to direct a 
verdict for the defendant or, at a minimum, to instruct the jury that the defendant did not 
exercise due care.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
1965) (explaining that the inferences from a defendant’s failure to comply with custom may 
justify a directed verdict of negligence); Morris, supra note 207, at 1162-63 (so suggesting). 
The move to comparative negligence also appears to affect the validity of the general prem-
ise.  One reason fixed rules restricted liability was because they made it easier to establish 
contributory negligence.  See James, supra note 101, at 689.  On comparative fault, see gen-
erally Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Efficiency of Comparative Negligence, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 
375 (1987). 
229. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A reporter’s notes.
230. Id. § 295A.
231. Id. cmt. a.
232. Id. cmt. b.
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learn how to respond to a situation, and the expectations of oth-
ers.233  These factors justified an inference that an actor was rea-
sonable in complying with community standards and unreasona-
ble in not complying.234  Compliance with custom was not 
conclusive on the negligence question, however, because customs 
that are generally reasonable may not be reasonable in light of the 
facts of a particular case.235  The commentary also noted the dif-
ferences among customs.  “Some of them are the result of careful 
thought and decision, while others arise from the kind of inad-
vertence, neglect, or deliberate disregard of a known risk which 
is associated with negligence.”236  It followed that there would be 
some situations when a reasonable person would not conform to 
a custom and others where a person could act reasonably when 
departing from custom.237 
The Third Restatement recognized the same role for custom 
as did the Second, but it refined the analysis by addressing com-
pliance with and departure from custom separately.  Compliance 
with custom was evidence that the actor was not negligent, but 
not conclusive on the matter.238  Departures from custom had the 
same relevance.  “An actor’s departure from the custom of the 
community, or of others in like circumstances, in a way that in-
creases risk is evidence of the actor’s negligence but does not re-
quire a finding of negligence.”239  The reporters’ note explained 
that this view was widely accepted—“there is no minority 
rule.”240 
The commentary to the Third Restatement went into consid-
erably more detail than the previous commentary, and specifically 
233. Id.
234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A cmt b.
235. Id. cmt. c.  The statement that evidence of noncompliance is not conclusive on 
the question of negligence seems in tension with the statement in comment b that the infer-
ences from a case of noncompliance can justify directing a verdict on negligence.  See id. 
cmt. b.  The statements are reconcilable, however, because the statement on directing a ver-
dict was limited to particular instances in which nothing in the situation led to a contrary 
conclusion.  Id.  
236. Id. cmt. c.
237. Id.  The comment also noted that there would be no incentive to make progress
if prudence only required customary conduct.  Id. 
238. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
239. Id.
240. Id. reporters’ note.  The note also stated that the provision was in line with the 
Second Restatement’s view.  Id.  
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addressed the rationale for the rule regarding departure from cus-
tom.241  Although compliance with custom could raise questions 
about alternatives available to the actor,242 departure from custom 
tended “to answer relevant questions concerning the availability 
and feasibility of . . . precautions.”243  “While proof of deviation 
from custom is only evidence of negligence, this evidence often 
has significant weight.”244  A party who had departed from cus-
tom could justify his actions by questioning the intelligence of the 
custom, by showing that his actions did not directly implicate the 
reasons for the customary precautions, or by showing that he ad-
dressed the risks in other ways.245  Proof of departure from custom 
was also relevant only if the departure increased the risks.246 
The modern position on custom, reflected in the Restate-
ments, functions much as a rule of evidence; it allows juries to 
hear evidence of custom, and give it such weight as the jury be-
lieves it deserves.247  The jury does not have to take the custom 
241. The commentary began by explaining that custom played a powerful role in 
many branches of law other than torts, such as contract law and international law.  Id. cmt. 
a. The commentary noted that Morris’s article on Custom and Negligence, supra note 207,
remained the leading article on the topic, and stated that Abraham’s article, supra note 184, 
was “[a]n excellent modern treatment” of the topic.  It also cited Epstein’s article The Path
to the T.J. Hooper, supra note 197, and Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a 
Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1999), as “provocative contemporary” works.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 13
reporters’ note.
242. The commentary to section 13(a) explained that compliance with custom could 
bear on whether further precautions were available, whether the precautions were feasible, 
and whether the actor should have known of them.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 cmt. b.  Custom was also relevant 
because ordinary care had bearing on what was reasonable care.  Id.  Additionally, a jury 
should know of custom because it warned that the verdict could have widespread implica-
tions.  Id.  Proof of compliance was not conclusive, however, because a whole industry could 
have lagged behind in adopting safety measures, particularly in cases in which the potential 
victims and defendants did not have contractual or other consensual relationships.  Id. 
243. Id. cmt. c.
244. Id.  Despite this statement, the commentary did not address whether a judge 
could rely on proof of departure from custom to justify directing a verdict.  This is somewhat 
surprising because the reporters’ note explained that compliance with custom, standing 
alone, could not justify a directed verdict on behalf of the actor, although it could play a 
significant role in the decision to direct a verdict.  Id. reporters’ note.  
245. Id. cmt. c.
246. Id.  The commentary also noted that some customs, such as driving on the right,
can induce general reliance by everyone engaging in an activity, and establish the standard 
by which all persons engaging in the activity are bound.  Id. cmt. d. 
247. See Abraham, supra note 184, at 1788-91.  Abraham details the different steps
by which a jury learns of custom evidence during a trial, as well as the treatment of custom 
in closing argument and jury instructions.  Id. at 1789-90.  Moreover, he notes that evidence 
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into account.248  “The jury may wholly disregard custom evidence 
without violating the custom rule.”249  This is dramatically differ-
ent from the jury’s role in modern negligence-per-se cases, where 
the jury is told that failure to follow the law is negligence.250 
C. Safety Codes and Other Standards without the Force
of Law
Customs and practices are often unwritten.  An industry 
might, however, issue safety standards that codify its customs and 
recognized practices.  A government agency might also issue 
safety recommendations.  Private standards and public recom-
mendations could reflect industry custom, and adherence to these 
standards could be so widespread as to convert the provisions to 
actual customs.251  It would seem logical that courts would treat 
private standards and recommendations that lacked the force of 
law in the same manner as customs.  The law did not readily take 
that course, however.  Evidentiary rules long limited evidence of 
private standards,252 and the Restatements did not address private 
standards until the commentary to the Third Restatement’s provi-
sion on custom.253 
establishing a practice is customary generally comes in through expert testimony.  Id. at 
1789. 
248. Id. at 1791.
249. Id.; see, e.g., 1 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § CV 401.03 (2018) (stating that 
“[y]ou may consider the degree to which such (methods) . . . have been customarily used” 
and that, if there is an accepted custom, “you may consider this along with all other facts and 
circumstances”); N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIV. § 2:16 (2017) (stating that a 
custom “may be considered some evidence of what constitutes reasonable conduct”).  But 
see CAL. CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.16 (2017) (saying that evidence that a person con-
formed or did not conform to custom “ought to be considered, but is not necessarily control-
ling”). 
250. See 1 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § CV 401.01 (2018) (“A person may be re-
quired by law to do something or not to do something.  Failure to do what is required by law 
is negligence, as is doing something the law prohibits.”); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 179-81. 
251. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 13 reporters’ note (explaining that private standards often take the form of docu-
ments called codes, such as the American National Standards Institute’s National Electric 
Safety Code).  
252. See infra Part II.C.
253. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 13 reporters’ note. 
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The Third Restatement treated noncompliance with private 
standards and governmental recommendations in the same man-
ner as custom, explaining that some cases included proof that an 
actor complied with or deviated from “a standard issued by a pri-
vate organization or a recommendation issued by a government 
agency.”254  The comments stated, without elaboration, that the 
rules regarding negligence per se did not apply to the former cases 
because the standards were “issued by a private body,” and that 
the latter cases did not implicate negligence per se because the 
doctrine did not apply to a “mere recommendation.”255  Standards 
or recommendations could nonetheless bear on the issue of neg-
ligence, such as when a party argued that compliance with private 
standards defeated negligence.256  If the evidence showed that the 
standard or recommendation was the equivalent of a custom, the 
commentary concluded, the standard should be treated like cus-
tom.257 
The Third Restatement was the first Restatement to discuss 
noncompliance with safety codes and private standards.258  That 
is not because private safety codes are recent innovations. They 
are not.  The National Electrical Code was first published in 
1897259 and the American National Standards Institute was 
254. Id. cmt. e.
255. Id. (referring to id. §§ 14-16).
256. Id.
257. Id. (“Insofar as . . . the standard or . . . recommendation is shown to be the equiv-
alent of custom, evidence concerning the standard or recommendation should be treated in 
accordance with this Section”).  The reporters’ note cited a number of cases considering 
whether private standards were the equivalent of custom.  Id. reporters’ note.  The commen-
tary also noted that the jurisdiction’s rules of evidence would govern the admissibility of the 
standard.  Id. cmt. e.  The reporters’ note further cited cases concerning the relation of the 
hearsay doctrine to private standards.  Id. reporters’ note. 
The commentary also addressed cases in which a defendant departed from its own 
standards, such as those in a corporation’s safety manual. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 cmt. f.  It noted that it could be unfair 
to admit such evidence because a defendant could have adopted greater safety precautions 
than necessary, but that the evidence could be relevant if the plaintiff had relied on defend-
ant’s standards in choosing to do business.  Id.  In light of these concerns, “the best position 
is the flexible position that the admissibility of evidence as to the actor’s departure from its 
own standard depends on all the circumstances of the individual case.”  Id.  The reporters’ 
note stated that the cases reach divided results on the issue.  Id. reporters’ note.   
258. Id. § 13 cmt. e.
259. BRIAN J. MCPARTLAND & JOSEPH F. MCPARTLAND, MCGRAW-HILL’S 
NATIONAL ELECTRICAL CODE HANDBOOK xvii (25th ed. 2005). 
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founded in 1918.260  The lack of judicial attention to private stand-
ards instead seems to have been a factor of both restrictive rules 
of evidence and the absence of a developed body of tort law in 
which standards were important.261  A 1965 law review article 
stated that “[f]ew attorneys have any familiarity with safety stand-
ards.”262  The development of products liability law, and tort 
law’s emerging focus on safety, required attention to safety 
codes.263  The law on the admissibility and use of safety stand-
ards, at bottom, reflects a changing view of the jury’s role in tort 
litigation. 
Private safety standards were not irrelevant in the first half 
of the 1900s, and quite a few cases addressed them.264  Many 
cases in the 1930s, for instance, arose from electrical accidents.265  
Some defendants in these cases argued that their compliance with 
electrical safety standards showed that they were not negligent.  
The Louisiana Court of Appeals accepted this argument in Bou-
dreaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,266 observing that the de-
fendant’s power lines were constructed in accordance with United 
States Bureau of Standards requirements and there was, “there-
fore, no proof of any negligence.”267  Plaintiffs in other cases used 
260. About ANSI, AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., http://www.ansi.org/about
_ansi/overview/overview.aspx?menuid=1 [https://perma.cc/YT6E-RHM3]. 
261. The Third Restatement suggests that the lack of focus on private standards was 
largely because evidentiary rules precluded reliance on such evidence.  RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 cmt. e.  The first 
article to discuss safety codes emphasized the novelty of products liability litigation in ex-
plaining why attorneys were generally unfamiliar with the use of standards.  Harry M. Philo, 
Use of Safety Standards, Codes and Practices in Tort Litigation, 41 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1, 1 (1965). 
262. Philo, supra note 261, at 1.
263. Id.
264. For early cases finding non-governmental standards admissible, see Ala. Power
Co. v. McIntosh, 122 So. 677, 680 (Ala. 1929) (finding that the National Electric Code 
(“NESC”) was admissible to show negligence of using prohibited fixtures); Leas v. Cont’l 
Fruit Express, 99 S.W. 859, 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) (finding rules of Master Car Builders’ 
Association admissible to show proper construction of train car); See generally Annotation, 
Admissibility in Evidence of Safety Codes Issued By Governmental Department or Commis-
sion, or Promulgated By Voluntary Associations, 122 A.L.R. 644 (1939).   
265. See cases discussed infra at text accompanying notes 266-83; Annotation, supra 
note 264.  
266. 135 So. 90, 91 (La. Ct. App. 1931).
267. Id.  The court did not elaborate on the nature of the Bureau of Standards’ require-
ments.  A later Fifth Circuit opinion explains that the Bureau of Standards is a division of 
the Department of Commerce that has authority to issue the standards for information, but 
that the Bureau could not regulate wiring, and the standards had no compulsive force.  Miss. 
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the standards on the offensive, arguing that defendants’ depar-
tures from safety standards showed negligence.  A Louisiana 
court was receptive to this view in Layne v. Louisiana Power & 
Light Co.268  The court found that the defendant violated the Na-
tional Electric Safety Code (NESC) by stringing uninsulated 
wires close to a metal roof, ruling that there could be “no doubt” 
about its negligence.269  The Fifth Circuit, however, refused to 
allow evidence that a defendant violated the NESC in its influen-
tial decision in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Whitescarver.270  
The court explained that the code had no legal force—the United 
States Bureau of Standards authorized its publication as “[i]nfor-
mation . . . of value to the public.”271  The standards were thus 
inadmissible because they simply represented the opinion of the 
compilers.272 
The Whitescarver opinion illustrates the early, leading ap-
proach:  holding evidence of non-legal standards inadmissible.273  
That view was not, however, universal.  In City of Dothan v. 
Hardy,274 the early, leading case allowing a plaintiff to rely on a 
defendant’s departure from private standards, a roofer was elec-
trocuted after he brushed against electric wires strung close to the 
top of the building where he was working.275  Plaintiffs argued 
that the city, which installed the wires, violated the clearance pro-
visions in the NESC.276  The court acknowledged that the Code 
had no legal force.277  It stated, “We concur in the view that such 
rules are not regulations having the force of law, whose violation 
is negligence per se.”278  The court further stated that the fact the 
Power & Light Co. v. Whitescarver, 68 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1934); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 270-73.  
268. 161 So. 29, 32 (La. Ct. App. 1935).
269. Id. at 30-32.  There is no indication in the opinion that the defendant challenged
admissibility of the Code.  See id. 
270. 68 F.2d at 930-31; see infra text accompanying notes 273-83 (explaining that
most courts took this approach). 
271. Whitescarver, 68 F.2d at 930.
272. Id. at 930-31.  The court compared the code to a scientific book, explaining that
scientific books could not be admitted into evidence in any state other than Alabama.  Id. at 
930-31; see infra text accompanying notes 284-91 (discussing evidentiary issues).
273. Whitescarver, 68 F.2d at 930-31.
274. 188 So. 2d 264, 265-66 (Ala. 1939).
275. Id. at 265-66.
276. Id. at 265.
277. Id.
278. Id. (discussing Whitescarver).
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Code lacked the force of law did not preclude its admission as 
expert opinion published under government auspices to aid the 
public safety.279  Fearing that a decision to exclude the code as 
evidence of improper installation would necessarily exclude its 
admission as evidence of proper installation, the court ruled that 
it would be improper for one agency of government to deny that 
another government agency’s instructions lacked probative 
force.280 
The dispute between the Whitescarver and City of Dothan 
courts was not really about tort law but about the rules of evi-
dence, specifically about the admissibility of scientific treatises 
and similar works.  The almost-universal rule of the time, as the 
Whitescarver court explained, was that scientific treatises were 
inadmissible because they were the mere opinions of the authors 
about a changing field, not delivered under oath or subject to 
cross-examination.281  Safety codes similarly dealt “with a con-
troversial and developing science in which opinions may vary and 
experience work great changes.”282  The City of Dothan court 
agreed with the analogy between safety codes and scientific trea-
tises, but found that the arguments for admitting the conclusions 
of an expert body outweighed those for excluding them.283  
Dothan was in the minority, and the accepted rule late into the 
279. See City of Dothan, 188 So. at 265-66. The court also relied on Layne, discussed 
supra at text accompanying notes 268-69, and Ala. Power Co. v. McIntosh, 122 So. 677 (Ala. 
1929).  The McIntosh court allowed evidence that the home electric receptacle that caught 
fire was forbidden by the National Electric Code, “the standard . . . used by all competent 
wiremen” and “the interior wireman’s Bible.”  McIntosh, 122 So. at 680.  The code reflected 
the judgment of those experienced in the business and was “evidence that the use of fixtures 
forbidden by it is negligence.”  Id.  
280. City of Dothan, 188 So. at 267.
281. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Whitescarver, 68 F.2d 928, 930-31 (5th Cir. 1934).
The court explained that the leading case for rejecting scientific books as primary evidence 
was Ashworth v. Kittridge, 66 Mass. 193 (1853).  Whitescarver, 68 F.2d at 930-31.  The rule 
against admissibility applied in Mississippi “and generally elsewhere except in Alabama.”  
Id. at 931.  The Ashworth court had rejected the admission of medical books for the reasons 
the Whitescarver court gave, and also because medical terminology would not be accessible 
to jurors.  Ashworth, 66 Mass. at 195. 
282. Whitescarver, 68 F.2d at 930.
283. City of Dothan, 188 So. at 266-67.  The court explained that the code was the 
product of a government bureau set up to acquire information from a wide variety of sources 
and make official findings regarding appropriate standards.  Id. at 267.  “That this agency 
invites scrutiny and criticism rather strengthens than weakens its findings.”  Id. 
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1950s was that safety codes lacking the force of law could not be 
admitted into evidence.284 
Essentially, the basis for the rule of inadmissibility was that 
safety standards were unreliable, changeable opinion.285  Also un-
derlying this rule was a distrust of the jury’s ability—a fear that it 
would not understand scientific terminology.286  The effect of the 
rule was to limit the jury’s role by keeping material out of the 
jury’s hands.287  The contrary view that took root in the 1960s 
reflected a sense that the jury should have access to information 
that would help it reach an informed decision.  Standards could 
aid the finder of fact in deciding what precautions were feasible 
ones that should have been known to the defendant288 and in de-
termining289 and applying290 the standard of care.  Courts became 
increasingly receptive to evidence regarding safety codes, and 
similar documents that lacked the force of law as evidentiary bar-
riers against admitting treatises and similar works began to fall.  
Two factors contributed to the shift.  One was a recognition that 
safety codes, unlike treatises, represented more than the opinion 
284. See Sloan v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 102 S.E.2d 822, 827 (N.C. 1958).  The 
Sloan court found that the National Electric Safety Code was not admissible because the state 
legislature had not approved it or given it the force of law.  Id.  The court cited secondary 
sources, American Jurisprudence, and an American Law Reports Annotation as support for 
the conclusion that safety codes and similar documents that lacked the force of law were 
inadmissible.  Id. at 826.  It distinguished the court’s earlier decision in Lutz Industries v. 
Dixie Home Stores, 88 S.E.2d 333 (N.C. 1955), which took judicial notice of provisions of 
the electric code that the legislature had given the force of law. Sloan, 102 S.E.2d at 827.   
The A.L.R. Annotation cited by the Sloan court explained the analogy between 
safety codes and scientific treatises, and said that both were generally inadmissible outside 
of Alabama.  Annotation, supra note 264, at 644-46. 
285. See Whitescarver, 68 F.2d at 930-31, discussed supra at text accompanying notes
270-73.
286. Ashworth, 66 Mass. at 195, discussed supra note 281.
287. The information could come before the jury indirectly, however.  The court in 
Hercules Powder Co. v. DiSabatino, 188 A.2d 529 (Del. 1963), said that the trial court 
properly allowed the defendant to cross-examine expert witnesses on the basis of the Na-
tional Electrical Safety Code.  Id. at 533.  The court said that it had no doubt that safety codes 
were not admissible as independent evidence to prove the truth of the standards, but were 
permissible to examine and cross-examine experts on the grounds of their opinions.  Id. 
288. Merchs. Nat’l Bank of Aurora v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 273 N.E.2d 809, 813
(Ill. 1971). 
289. Ruffiner v. Material Serv. Corp., 506 N.E.2d 581, 584 (Ill. 1987).
290. Frazier v. Cont’l Oil Co., 568 F.2d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 1978).
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of the authors.  The other, reflecting this recognition, was mod-
ernization of the rules of evidence.291 
The New Jersey Supreme Court opinion in McComish v. 
DeSoi292 explained the first point.  It found that it was proper to 
admit safety manuals in a negligence case arising out of an indus-
trial accident.293  The court explained that the manuals were not 
offered as treatises but “as safety codes, as objective standards of 
safe construction, generally recognized and accepted as such in 
the type of construction industry involved.”294  The manual was 
not simply one person’s opinion, but “a consensus of opinion car-
rying the approval of a significant segment of an industry.”295  
The code was not substantive law, but it did illustrate safety prac-
tices that generally prevailed in an industry.296 
Not only were safety codes different from treatises, but the 
rules regarding admission of treatises had been relaxed.  The Uni-
form Rules of Evidence allowed admission of “[a] published trea-
tise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, science or art 
to prove the truth of the matter stated therein” if the court took 
judicial notice or an expert testified that it was reliable author-
ity.297  The comment to the Rule said that, at the time, very few 
courts admitted treatises into evidence, and that caused extensive 
291. See Philo, supra note 261, at 7-10; see also 1 BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN 
TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 3:68 (2d ed. 2017) (noting that the prior view was 
that standards were inadmissible because they were considered hearsay, they did not deal 
with an exact science, and they lacked the force of law). 
292. 200 A.2d 116, 120-21 (N.J. 1964).
293. Id. at 123.
294. Id. at 120.
295. Id. 120-21.
296. Id. at 121.  The Washington Supreme Court, sitting en banc, made similar points 
in a careful decision allowing a ladder manufacturer to introduce evidence of compliance 
with American Standards Association standards regarding the manufacture of portable metal 
ladders.  Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 453 P.2d 619, 621-23 (Wash. 
1969) (en banc).  The court found that the trustworthiness of such standards, and the neces-
sity of their use dictated allowing the evidence notwithstanding the hearsay rule.  Id. at 623. 
The standards’ trustworthiness were, according to the court, beyond doubt.  Id.  They were 
published after thorough research by a special committee that was established for the purpose 
and reflected a broad membership, a subcommittee of which specialized in metal ladders.  
Id.  The fact that scientific evidence developed over time did not support its exclusion or 
scientific evidence “would never be admissible.”  Id. at 623-24.  “Conceding therefore that 
the code is an expression of opinions of a group of experts, those opinions are relevant on 
the question of whether the defendant manufacturer properly designed and manufactured the 
article in question . . . .”  Id. at 625.  If these standards were not the latest and best opinion 
on the subject, plaintiff could have proved that fact.  Id. 
297. UNIF. R. EVID. 63(31) (1953).
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debate over whether counsel could impeach experts by referring 
to treatises.298  The new rule would eliminate that confusion.299  
The Federal Rules of Evidence now authorize admission of state-
ments in learned treatises under an exception to the hearsay 
rule.300 
The first scholarship discussing the use of safety codes in 
tort litigation appeared as courts relaxed the evidentiary barriers 
to their admissibility.  The 1965 guide Use of Safety Standards, 
Codes and Practices in Tort Litigation presented the topic as a 
“[n]ew [s]ubject” with which few attorneys had familiarity.301  It 
outlined out how attorneys could find applicable codes and use 
them in preparing to file suit, in discovery, and at trial.302  It said 
that safety codes were admissible if properly presented, and that 
the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in McComish was “or 
soon will be” the law.303  Noting that safety standards and codes 
were a safety engineer’s basic tools, the article found it “ridicu-
lous” to allow the engineer to testify based on what was in the 
codes but not to admit the codes themselves.304 
A law review comment published several years later called 
the assertion that safety codes were admissible premature.305  It 
did note a “trend toward greater liberality” in admitting codes, 
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. FED. R. EVID. 803(18); see generally 2 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES ON
EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 9.11 (7th ed. 1994) (discussing approaches to admitting 
safety standards).  
The evidentiary problems do not arise with statutes and other legal material be-
cause the judge has the authority to investigate the law and take notice of it.  Some authority 
speaks of a judge’s power to take judicial notice of law.  See Philo, supra note 261, at 8; see 
also EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 1-12 (new ed. 1963). The Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence explain that the judge has the inherent authority to recognize law 
aside from rules on judicial notice.  FED. R. EVID. 201(c) advisory committee’s note to 1972 
proposed rule. 
301. Philo, supra note 261, at 1.  This article and a law review comment, James L.
Foutch, Comment, Admissibility of Safety Codes, Rules and Standards in Negligence Cases, 
37 TENN. L. REV. 581 (1970), appear to be the first scholarship on the issue other than dis-
cussion in evidence treatises and general references like American Law Reports annotations.  
I have found no previous articles, and neither article cites any other earlier works.  For a 
discussion of Foutch’s comment, see infra text accompanying notes 305-06. 
302. Philo, supra note 261, at 1-12.
303. Id. at 7 (discussing Uniform Rules of Evidence).  The article noted, though, that
“[l]ower courts . . . often stumbled and refused to admit a standard or code because of the 
hearsay rule.”  Id.   
304. Id. at 8.
305. Foutch, supra note 301, at 593.
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and concluded that attorneys “would do well to introduce safety 
codes and standards for admission when they are relevant to the 
issue of negligence.”306  In 1974, The American Law Reports an-
notators discussed the issue, and stated that, “the modern trend 
towards greater admissibility of these codes and standards has ap-
parently been great enough to make it unwise to attempt to iden-
tify any majority rule or minority rule.”307  Commentators now 
say that safety standards are “generally admissible.”308 
Safety codes reflect accepted industry practices, and some 
courts held that codes were admissible because they were, essen-
tially, evidence of custom.  Codes were admissible not as substan-
tive scientific truth but as “a recognition and codification of cus-
toms and practices.”309  This view treated safety codes as 
permissible evidence of community standards and custom.310  The 
court in Wheeler v. Jones,311 for example, allowed evidence of 
safety standards to show that the “standards of the community” 
dictated against using unmarked, ordinary glass in sliding doors 
leading to a children’s pool area.312  Courts recognize that safety 
standards, like evidence of custom, can educate the jury on what 
is feasible, and what the defendant knew or should have known.313 
The legal consideration of private standards and custom be-
gan to merge as the evidentiary barriers to admitting standards 
fell.  A number of cases admitted standards specifically to show 
custom.  Perhaps the most influential case of this kind is the Fifth 
Circuit decision in Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, 
306. Id.
307. Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Admissibility in Evidence, on Issue of Negligence,
of Codes or Standards of Safety Issued or Sponsored by Governmental Body or By Voluntary 
Association, 58 A.L.R.3d 148, § 2[a] (1974 & 2017 Supp.).  This Annotation superseded the 
annotation of the same name at 78 A.L.R.2d 778 (1961).   
308. 1 LINDAHL, supra note 291, § 3:68; see Elledge v. Richland/Lexington Sch. Dist.
Five, 573 S.E.2d 789, 795 (S.C. 2002) (stating that the “general rule” was that standards were 
admissible to help establish the standard of care in a negligence case); 2 FISHMAN, supra 
note 300, § 9:11, at 89 (saying the “prevailing view” is in favor of admitting safety codes 
and standards). 
309. Foutch, supra note 301, at 582.
310. Id.
311. 431 P.2d 985 (Utah 1967).
312. Id. at 987.  The court found that the standards showed there were widespread 
dangers involved.  Id.  The case discussed the admissibility of Federal Housing Administra-
tion standards but the court did not explain what those standards were or which body prom-
ulgated them.  See id. 
313. Merchs. Nat’l Bank of Aurora v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 273 N.E.2d 809, 813
(Ill. 1971). 
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Inc.314  In that case, the court allowed the plaintiff to introduce 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) circulars, which gov-
erned landing procedures at uncontrolled airports, to show the 
standard of care pilots customarily followed in making such land-
ings.315  The court explained that compliance or noncompliance 
with custom was not conclusive on the issue of negligence, but 
was a factor the finder of fact could consider.316  Both plaintiff 
and defendant pilots testified that they were familiar with FAA 
advisory material and that pilots customarily followed the circu-
lars, making them relevant evidence of pilots’ customary prac-
tices.317  The standards helped to both show that defendant’s pilot 
fell below the standard of care, and to rebut the claim that plain-
tiff’s pilot was contributorily negligent.318 
Other courts followed the lead of the Fifth Circuit in Muncie 
Aviation Corp.  The Tenth Circuit cited Muncie when deciding 
whether the NESC was relevant to determining if the defendant 
was negligent if the industry custom was to abide by the code.319  
The Oregon Supreme Court similarly found it proper to consider 
the American National Standards Institute standards as evidence 
of the industry custom.320  The Third Restatement drew on these 
cases in discussing safety codes in the section on custom, noting 
that compliance or noncompliance with such a standard was rele-
vant to the issue of negligence.321 
314. 519 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1975).
315. Id. at 1180.  The circulars did not have the force of law.  Id.
316. Id. at 1180-81.
317. Id. at 1181.  The court also carefully discussed the argument of whether the
admission of the circulars violated the rule against hearsay.  Id. at 1181-84.  The court said 
that considerations of practical necessity and trustworthiness rendered them admissible.  Id. 
at 1182.  It noted that its decision was “in accord with the modern trend of cases” and that 
courts had become “increasingly appreciative” of the value of safety codes to assist the trier 
of fact.  Id. at 1183. 
318. Id. at 1181.  The court found that the circulars were also relevant to showing 
noncompliance with an FAA regulation having the force of law.  Id. 
319. Ruhs v. Pac. Power & Light, 671 F.2d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1982).
320. Hansen v. Abrasive Eng’g & Mfg., Inc., 856 P.2d 625, 628 (Or. 1993) (en banc).
For other cases discussing safety codes as relevant to custom, see Sawyer v. Dreis & Krump 
Mfg. Co., 493 N.E.2d 920, 925 (N.Y. 1986); Miner v. Long Island Lighting Co., 353 N.E.2d 
805, 810 (N.Y. 1976); Crystal Tire Co. v. Home Serv. Oil Co., 525 S.W.2d 317, 323-24 (Mo. 
1975) (en banc); Briere v. Lathrop Co., 258 N.E.2d 597, 604 (Ohio 1970). 
321. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 13 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
Jury instructions on compliance with safety standards sometimes equate those 
standards with custom.  See 4 MINN. PRACTICE: JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CIV. § 25.47 
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Safety standards, then, are generally now admissible as a 
codification of industry customs and practices.  They are not con-
clusive evidence of negligence, and a violation of a standard is 
not negligence per se because only violations of law have that 
consequence.322  Numerous cases that admit safety codes into ev-
idence emphasize the standards are not conclusive on the subject 
of negligence323 and that their violation is not negligence per 
se.324  The cases are short on reasoning, however.  A rare case that 
did attempt an explanation, Jorgensen v. Horton,325 suggested 
that the difference lay in the fact that negligence per se was based 
on a fear of allowing a jury to override legislative judgment.326  
“We cannot apply the same reasoning to private safety codes 
which have not been given the force of law.”327 
D. Law is What Matters:  Government Adoption of
Private Standards
Conduct that violates private standards is not negligence per 
se because the standards, like the customs they often codify, do 
not have legal effect.328  Standards that lack the force of law, even 
those that—like the NESC—are issued under the auspices of gov-
ernment body, do not have negligence-per-se effect, and histori-
cally were not even admissible evidence.329  Courts treated codes 
(6th ed. 2017) (“Evidence of standards or custom is not conclusive.  It is just one piece of 
evidence.”).  Other instructions treat standards separately from custom, but have the same 
imports.  See PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD CIV.  JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 13.110 (2014) (“If 
you find that [name of defendant] violated the [regulation or standard] . . . this [violation] is 
evidence you must consider, along with all other evidence, in deciding whether [name of 
defendant] was negligent.”). 
322. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
323. See, e.g., Sawyer, 493 N.E.2d at 925; Barmeyer v. Mont. Power Co., 657 P.2d 
594, 602-03 (Mont. 1983). 
324. See, e.g., Crane & Crane, Inc. v. C & D Elec., Inc., 683 P.2d 1103, 1109 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1984); Planters Elec. Membership Corp. v. Burke, 105 S.E.2d 787, 793 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1958); see generally Feld, Annotation, supra note 307, §2[b].   
325. 206 N.W.2d 100 (Iowa 1973).
326. Id. at 102-03.
327. Id. at 103.  For further discussion of the court’s reasoning, see infra text accom-
panying notes 373-77. 
328. See supra text accompanying notes 322-27.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 269-83.
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issued by private bodies the same as those from government au-
thorities lacking the force of law.330  Commentary criticized this 
approach, arguing that courts should consider the codes issued by 
government agencies in light of the agencies’ familiarity “with all 
segments of the community under consideration.”331  That ap-
proach did not gain currency.  A code’s legal force, or lack 
thereof, determined not only whether violation of the code would 
be negligence per se, but frequently whether the code would be 
admissible at all. 
With a code’s legal force the key question, courts often had 
to determine whether a code had legal force.  It was not always 
easy to determine whether a legislative body incorporated a code, 
giving it the force of law.  The North Carolina Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lutz Industries v. Dixie Home Stores332 is a good ex-
ample.  The plaintiff sued to recover the value of real and personal 
property lost in a fire allegedly caused by wiring and fixtures that 
violated the NESC.333  The defendant argued that the Code was 
inadmissible, relying on cases that followed the general rule 
against admitting safety codes lacking the force of law.334  The 
court ruled that those cases were inapplicable because the North 
Carolina Building Code had incorporated the electric code, giving 
it legal force.335  “It is well settled law in this jurisdiction, that 
when a statute imposes upon a person a specific duty for the pro-
tection of others, that a violation of such statute is negligence per 
330. Compare In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int’l Airport on June 24,
1975, 635 F.2d 67, 77 (2d Cir. 1980) (allowing evidence of FAA advisory materials), and 
Fluor Corp. v. Black, 338 F.2d 830, 832 (9th Cir. 1964) (allowing evidence of the United 
States Corps of Engineers’ Safety Manual and Arizona Industrial Commission rules), with 
Johnson v. District of Columbia, 728 A.2d 70, 75-76 (D.C. 1999) (finding Consumer Prod-
ucts Safety Commission notices admissible only if they stated the standard of care), and 
Dominick v. Brockton-Taunton Gas Co., 255 N.E.2d 370, 371 (Mass. 1970) (finding testi-
mony regarding Federal Housing Agency bulletin properly excluded because it was not in 
effect when gas line was installed and there was no duty to remove old fixtures).  See gener-
ally Feld, Annotation, supra note 307, §§ 5-6 (discussing cases). 
331. Foutch, supra note 301, at 584.  The Comment stated the court that refused to
reject the evidence on hearsay grounds generally offered “the succinct statement that since 
the rule has not been legislatively passed upon, it cannot be deemed evidence of negligence.”  
Id. (citation omitted). 
332. 88 S.E.2d 333, 339 (N.C. 1955).
333. Id. at 336.
334. Id. at 340 (relying on the early A.L.R. annotation on the topic and cases such as
Whitescarver); see supra text accompanying notes 271 & 277-79 (discussing the annotation 
and Whitescarver). 
335. Lutz Indus., 88 S.E.2d at 339.
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se.”336  The court followed Lutz in Jenkins v. Leftwich Electric 
Co.,337 holding that the defendant’s violations of the National 
Electrical Code, which North Carolina law gave the force of law, 
were negligence per se.338 
The matter is more complicated than it may appear.  The Lutz 
court reached its conclusion only after a painstaking analysis of 
the North Carolina building code and its incorporation of the Na-
tional Electrical Code.339  The court explained that the North Car-
olina General Assembly enacted a Building Code in 1933 which 
created the North Carolina Building Code Council and authorized 
it to draft a state building code.340  The Council promulgated the 
state Building Code in 1936.341  This Code required that electrical 
systems be installed in accordance with the National Electrical 
Code approved by the American Standards Association.342  In 
1941, the state legislature revisited the law, “restricting and de-
fining the authority of the Building Code Council.”343  This 1941 
law “ratified and adopted” the 1936 Building Code.344  This his-
tory led the court to conclude that, “[t]he 1941 Act ratified and 
adopted the North Carolina Building Code published in 1936 by 
clear and specific reference.”345  The fact that the Code, which 
incorporated the National Electrical Code, had the force of law 
meant that the violation was negligence per se.346 
Having found adoption by reference, the court then turned to 
the validity of that incorporation.  The court said that “reference 
336. Id.  The court ultimately remanded with orders that the Superior Court require
the plaintiff to amend the complaint to specifically plead the parts of the National Electrical 
Code on which it relied.  Id. at 343. 
337. 119 S.E.2d 767 (N.C. 1961).
338. Id. at 775.  The court discussed the history of the legislature’s adoption of the 
state building code and the standards it incorporated, concluding that the National Electrical 
Code “had the force and effect of law” on the day of the fire at issue.  Id. at 774 (citing Lutz 
Indus., 88 S.E.2d 333). 
339. Lutz Indus., 88 S.E.2d at 337-39.
340. Id. at 337.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 338.
344. Lutz Indus., 88 S.E.2d at 339.  This law provided that the Building Code Council
could enact less stringent requirements with the Insurance Commissioner’s approval.  Id. at 
338. In 1945, the North Carolina Insurance Department reissued the 1936 Code.  Id.
345. Id. at 339.
346. Id.
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statutes” are “approved method[s] of legislation to avoid . . . rep-
etition.”347  This situation was somewhat different from a typical 
incorporation by reference because the legislation incorporated 
non-statutory material.348  The court approved of the law none-
theless, quoting a law review article which stated there was no 
reason to doubt the validity of the enactment.349  The court con-
cluded that “[t]he General Assembly can prescribe standards of 
conduct which have the force and effect of law.”350  The legisla-
ture here specifically set the standard of care for electrical systems 
and required that they comply with the National Electrical 
Code.351  The court found that the National Electrical Code refer-
ence in the 1936 Building Code had the force of law by virtue of 
the 1941 Act, and was admissible as evidence.352 
Other courts have also looked to whether a private organiza-
tion’s standards had attained the force of law through incorpora-
tion, conducting similarly detailed analyses of the law-making 
process and scope of incorporation in order to determine a stand-
ard’s legal effect.  The Alaska Supreme Court, for example, found 
that a trial court erred in not instructing the jury that a failure to 
manufacture a tank in accordance with the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers’ standards was negligence per se.353  The 
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Lutz Indus., 88 S.E.2d at 339 (citing A Survey of Statutory Changes in North 
Carolina in 1941, 19 N.C. L. REV. 435, 458 (1941) [hereinafter Statutory Changes]).  The 
article said it was “[v]ery likely” that the original building code legislation that delegated 
power to the Building Code Council attempted an improper delegation of legislative power.  
Statutory Changes, supra, at 457.  However, the 1941 law put the Code “on a better founda-
tion.”  Id. at 458.  Nonetheless, the article suggested that arguments remained that the dele-
gation of legislative power went too far.  Id. at 458-59. 
350. Lutz Indus., 88 S.E.2d at 339.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 340.  The court distinguished a Kansas case that found that a Kansas law 
incorporating the National Electrical Code was void for uncertainty and an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative power to a private group. Id. (citing State v. Crawford, 177 P. 360, 
361 (Kan. 1919)).  The Lutz court found the situation in North Carolina was different because 
the 1941 law explicitly ratified and adopted the National Electrical Code referred to the 1936 
Building Code.  Id.  It further noted the presumption that legislation is constitutional and said 
that the constitutionality of the 1941 Act was not challenged in this case.  Id. at 340-41. 
353. Harned v. Dura Corp., 665 P.2d 5, 11-12 (Alaska 1983).
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court found that state law had incorporated the standards by ref-
erence when the tank was manufactured,354 noting that it had pre-
viously found that violations of the Uniform Building Code, 
which the Alaska Administrative Code incorporated, were negli-
gence per se.355 
The Texas Supreme Court, on the other hand, found that the 
Corps of Engineers Safety Manual did not have the force of 
law.356  The court of appeals considered the manual a safety stat-
ute because Armed Services Procurement regulations adopted it 
by reference.357  The court rejected that argument, explaining that 
the manual did not have statutory status.358  It said that, although 
it was clear that one statute could incorporate another by refer-
ence, the courts had not held that adoption by reference could con-
fer statutory status on a rule which did not previously have the 
force of law.359  It also noted that the regulations were not adopted 
in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act or published 
in the Federal Register.360  Thus, there was no statutory viola-
tion.361 
The courts agree that a clear line determines whether the vi-
olation of a safety standard is negligence per se:  whether the 
standard has legal force.  It does not matter which body originally 
354. The court reviewed the process of incorporation in some detail in a long footnote.
It explained that the Alaska territorial legislature approved the American Society of Mechan-
ical Engineers (ASME) Code in 1949 and the Board of Boiler Rules adopted it in the Alaska 
Code in 1955.  Id. at 10 n.17.  The Department of Labor ratified the ASME Code after state-
hood pursuant to statutory authority authorizing it to adopt the existing codification of ASME 
standards.  Id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 18.60.180 (1955)).   
355. Id. at 11-13.  The court relied on Northern Lights Motel, Inc. v. Sweaney, 561
P.2d 1176 (Alaska 1977), which found that a violation of the Uniform Building Code was
negligence per se because it was validly incorporated by reference into Alaska law.  Harned, 
665 P.2d at 11 n.18.  The court explained that it had previously adopted the law of negligence
per se as found in the Second Restatement and determined that the doctrine applied to viola-
tions of the Department of Labor’s safety regulations.  Id. at 12-13.
356. B-R Dredging Co. v. Rodriguez, 564 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Tex. 1978).  This was
not precisely a negligence-per-se case.  The plaintiff argued that a boat was “unseaworth[y] 
per se” because it violated the manual.  Id. at 694. 
357. Id. at 696.
358. Id. at 695-96.
359. Id. at 696.
360. Id.
361. B-R Dredging Co., 564 S.W.2d at 696-97; see also Herbst v. Miller, 830 P.2d 
1268, 1270-71 (Mont. 1992) (holding that the state legislature did not adopt the Uniform 
Building Code by reference so violation of the State Building Code was not negligence per 
se, but the Town of Belgrade adopted the Uniform Building Code by reference in a town 
ordinance, and a violation of that ordinance, incorporating the Code, was negligence per se). 
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drafted the standard or how it came to have the force of law.  The 
final determination of whether a violation is negligence per se 
rests ultimately not on tort law, but on administrative law or the 
vagaries of the state legislative process.  The consequences of this 
inquiry can be tremendous: it can mean the difference between 
the jury having the power to decide a negligence case without 
even having a safety code admitted in evidence and being in-
structed that a violation of a safety code is negligence per se. 
The North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in Sloan v. 
Carolina Power & Light Co.362 illustrates this point.  The case 
was filed on behalf of the estate of a telephone lineman who was 
electrocuted after a telephone line contacted a power line that al-
legedly violated the clearance requirements of the NESC, issued 
by the United States Department of Commerce.363  The question 
was whether the lower court properly refused to admit the NESC 
into evidence,364  and the court concluded that the refusal was 
proper.  It discussed the general rule against admission of safety 
codes into evidence365 and its prior discussion in Lutz Industries 
v. Dixie Home Stores,366 which found that the state legislature had
given parts of the National Electrical Code the force of law and
that its violation was negligence per se.367  Here, however, noth-
ing indicated that the General Assembly had approved the NESC,
and there was nothing that would give it the force of law.368  It
was, accordingly, proper to exclude the NESC from evidence.369
The force of law is what matters.  It is perhaps surprising, 
then, that the cases barely touch on why force of law matters.  
Courts generally just state the rule that only violations of law are 
362. 102 S.E.2d 822 (N.C. 1958).
363. Id. at 826-28.
364. Id. at 826.
365. Id. (discussing Whitescarver); see supra text accompanying notes 264-308 (dis-
cussing the law on admissibility of safety codes into evidence). 
366. 88 S.E.2d 333, 339-41 (N.C. 1955) (discussed supra text accompanying notes
332-52).
367. Id. at 339; see also Sloan, 102 S.E.2d at 826-27.
368. Sloan, 102 S.E.2d at 827.
369. Id.  The effect of the determination is now not quite as stark in most jurisdictions
because most courts now find safety codes admissible.  See supra text accompanying note 
309.  The force of law still has a great significance in terms of the jury instructions, however.
See supra text accompanying notes 176-77 (discussing negligence-per-se jury instructions)
& note 322 (discussing instructions for violation of standards).
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negligence per se.370  Many cases simply note in passing that vi-
olations of safety codes and similar standards are not negligence 
per se.371  A typical example is the Supreme Court of Montana’s 
statement in Harwood v. Glacier Electric Cooperative, Inc.372 
that the violation of a non-statutory standard could be used as ev-
idence of negligence but “it is insufficient grounds on which to 
find the defendant negligent per se.”373 
Only a few cases discuss the issue more fully.  The Iowa 
Supreme Court discussed the question in Jorgensen v. Horton,374 
a case in which the plaintiff argued on appeal that the trial court 
erred by not instructing the jury that a failure to follow the Asso-
ciated General Contractors of America’s safety code was negli-
gence per se.375  The court explained that it had previously limited 
the doctrine of negligence per se to violations of statutes and or-
dinances which establish the standard of care.376  Negligence per 
se rested on the rationale that it would be improper for a jury to 
approve conduct that the legislature had said was unreasonable.377  
“We cannot apply the same reasoning to private safety codes 
which have not been given the force of law.”378  The same court 
later held that only bodies with legislative authority can establish 
370. See, e.g., Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1204 (D.N.M. 2008).
371. See, e.g., Flechsig v. United States, 991 F.2d 300, 304 (6th Cir. 1993); LaVine 
v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp., 557 F.2d 730, 733 (10th Cir. 1977); City of Dothan v. Hardy,
188 So. 264, 265 (Ala. 1939); Kent Vill. Assocs. Joint Venture v. Smith, 657 A.2d 330, 337
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); Elledge v. Richland/Lexington Sch. Dist. Five, 534 S.E.2d 289,
290-91 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000); see also Hansen v. Abrasive Eng’g & Mfg., Inc., 856 P.2d 625,
628 (Or. 1993) (noting that violation of an industry custom does not constitute negligence
per se).
372. 949 P.2d 651, 656 (Mont. 1997).
373. Id. at 656.
374. 206 N.W.2d 100 (Iowa 1973).
375. Id. at 102.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 103 (quoting Thayer, supra note 12, at 322).
378. Id.  The Superior Court of Delaware discussed the issue in similar terms in 
Fanean v. Rite Aid Corp. of Del., 984 A.2d 812, 824 (Del. Super. Ct. 2009), finding that a 
violation of the American Pharmaceutical Association’s standards could not serve as the ba-
sis of a negligence per se claim.  “The basic concept of negligence per se is to ease the 
requirements of proving negligence if a party inflicts harm that the General Assembly at-
tempted to alleviate by legislative enactment.  That power does not exist in private organi-
zations.”  Id.  The Pharmaceutical Association was a private organization so its rules could 
not be the basis of negligence-per-se liability.  Id. at 823-24. 
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rules that bind all individuals.379  It explained that “rules of con-
duct that establish absolute standards of care, the violation of 
which is negligence per se, must be ordained by a state legislative 
body or an administrative agency regulating on a statewide basis 
under authority of the legislature.”380 
To the extent the cases explain the basis of the law, then, 
they rest on a desire to honor a legislative judgment.  The tech-
nical force of law an enactment has, even force that comes about 
by virtue of a long-ago legislative decision to incorporate a pri-
vate code, determines if the jury can assess the reasonableness of 
the conduct at issue or is told that a violation of the standard is 
negligence.  Courts do not consider the real question, which is 
whether a legislative decision to incorporate a private code is re-
ally a decision to have that code set the standard of care and alter 
the jury’s role in civil tort litigation. 
III. THE LESSONS OF HISTORY: THE PROBLEMS
WITH NEGLIGENCE PER SE 
A. The Current Law and the Role of the Jury
Negligence per se hinges on whether a standard has the force 
of law.  It does not matter how the standard attained the force of 
law—legislative enactment, municipal lawmaking, administra-
tive regulation, or legislative or administrative adoption of a pri-
vate standard—the force of law is what matters.  The positive law 
is determinative even if the custom is to violate it.381  Custom does 
not impose negligence-per-se liability no matter how universally 
followed the custom, nor does a private standard no matter how 
accepted or authoritative.382  The force of law governs. 
The determination that a law has negligence per se impact is 
significant because that determination changes the jury’s role.  
The jury does not decide whether the defendant acted as a reason-
379. Griglione v. Martin, 525 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Iowa 1994) (finding that violation of
police operating procedures and private safety codes is not negligence per se). 
380. Id.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 170-71 (discussing Restatement position).
382. See supra Part II.B (discussing custom) & Part II.C (discussing private stand-
ards). 
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able person would have acted but, rather, plays the historical func-
tion of determining if the defendant violated a statute.383  If a child 
died in a hotel swimming pool left unfenced in violation of a state 
statute, the judge in most states would tell the jury there is negli-
gence.  The judge would instruct the jury: “If you find that [name 
of defendant] violated this law, you must find that [name of de-
fendant] was negligent” as a matter of law.384  The instruction 
would be very different if the defendant violated hoteliers’ cus-
toms or a safety standard lacking legal force.  The jury would then 
have a much different, more meaningful, and more difficult job.  
The judge would instruct it that, if the jury found that the defend-
ant violated a custom of which it should have known, “you may 
consider this along with all other facts and circumstances in this 
case when deciding whether the defendant(s) (was) (were) negli-
gent.”385  The instruction would be similar if a safety standard 
were in effect.  The judge would tell the jury: “[i]f you find that 
[name of defendant] violated the [regulation or standard], then 
[name of defendant]’s violation of this [regulation or standard] is 
evidence you must consider, along with all other evidence, in de-
ciding whether [name of defendant] was negligent.”386  The jury 
would consider all the relevant evidence in either case to deter-
mine the defendant’s negligence. 
The jury’s limited role in negligence per se cases stands 
against a backdrop of an increasingly broad jury role in most tort 
litigation.  Judges a century ago kept cases from the jury by find-
ing defendants who violated common-law standards of conduct 
per se negligent.387  Actions that violated custom and statute were 
also negligence per se.388  Courts are now reluctant to announce 
firm rules of conduct.  The doctrine of negligence per se stands 
against the backdrop of “an ethics of particularism” that rejects 
the notion that general rules can produce fair results in all cases 
383. Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes, supra note 12, at 455.
384. See PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD CIV.  JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 13.100 (2013); su-
pra notes 176-77 & accompanying text (discussing negligence-per-se jury instructions and 
giving examples of other instructions).   
385. See 1 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § CV 401.03 (2018); supra text accompanying 
notes 249-50 (discussing jury instructions on custom and giving examples). 
386. See PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD CIV.  JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 13.110 (2014) (re-
ferring specifically to violation of ANSI standards); supra note 321 (discussing jury instruc-
tions on safety standards).   
387. See supra Part I.A.
388. See supra Part I.A.
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and that decides cases “based on the circumstances of each indi-
vidual situation.”389  The individual situation is irrelevant in one 
situation, however—when a law is at stake.  The jury must then 
find the defendant negligent. 
Negligence per se is an even more potent doctrine than it 
used to be.  Not only does law play an enhanced role in most in-
dividuals’ daily lives,390 and not only do violations of an ex-
panded body of law impose negligence-per-se liability,391 but 
those are the only cases in which a jury is routinely prohibited 
from assessing the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct. 
B. The Problems with the Current Law
This state of affairs would perhaps be justified, and could at 
least be explained, if the legal enactments that impose negligence-
per-se liability reflected a conscious legislative determination that 
a violation of the legal standard should alter tort law or if the doc-
trine were the result of a carefully-reasoned evolution of the com-
mon law.  But neither is the case.  Even if one can fairly assume 
that a state legislature enacts standards with the understanding 
that a violation will alter the scope of tort liability,392 the same 
cannot logically be said when a state court imposes negligence-
per-se liability because a party violated a federal statute,393 mu-
nicipal ordinance, or administrative rule,394 or because a state leg-
islature or administrative agency ratified a code that incorporated 
by reference safety standards that would otherwise have no legal 
force.395  The current state of affairs also does not reflect a rea-
389. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 8 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010); see supra text accompanying notes 142-48 (dis-
cussing changing role of the jury). 
390. See supra text accompanying notes 160-61.
391. See supra text accompanying notes 162-63.
392. This was one of Professor Thayer’s arguments in support of the doctrine back in 
1914, and an argument reiterated by the Third Restatement of Torts.  See supra text accom-
panying note 75 (discussing Thayer) & 156 (discussing the Restatement).  See also KEETON 
ET AL., supra note 14, § 36, at 220-21 (making this point). 
393. See also Kritchevsky, supra note 6, at 128-30, in which I explain at length why 
courts should not give violations of federal laws negligence-per-se effect. 
394. See supra text accompanying note 159 (discussing Third Restatement).
395. See supra Part II.D.
106 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  71:1 
soned evolution.  There is essentially no explanation for why neg-
ligence per se became limited to violations of law,396 and the cur-
rent cases largely reiterate the limitation with no attention to why 
the rules are what they are.397  Legislative decisions on matters 
remote from tort law determine the scope of negligence law with 
no consideration of why, or whether, the legislative decision 
should have that impact. 
The unquestioning acceptance of negligence per se, without 
careful focus on the validity of the doctrine, has prevented courts 
from recognizing that the concerns that led courts to stop giving 
violations of custom and common law rules negligence-per-se ef-
fect also apply to statutory violations.  Just as a custom may be 
out of date or unsuited to a particular situation,398 so may a statute.  
As Professor Fleming James noted over a half century ago, “many 
statutes on the books today are ill conceived, or hastily drawn, or 
obsolete.”399  He said that it was unrealistic to say that reasonable 
individuals “would blindly obey all the regulatory statutes under 
all circumstances” and wrong to deprive the jury of its usual role 
whenever a statutory violation was at issue.400  The ethic of par-
ticularism recognizing that general rules may be ill-suited to spe-
cific situations can also be the case when a statute or regulation is 
396. See supra Part II.B.
397. See, e.g., Sibert-Dean v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 721 F.3d 699, 703,
705-06 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (upholding negligence-per-se jury instruction for
violation of statute requiring that driver “give full time and attention” to driving); Schlimmer
v. Poverty Hunt Club, 597 S.E.2d 43, 45-46 (Va. 2004) (finding that failure to give negli-
gence-per-se instruction for alleged violation of statute prohibiting reckless handling of a
firearm was error and that error was not harmless).
398. See supra text accompanying notes 235-46 (discussing this reason for not giving 
violations of custom negligence-per-se effect). 
399. James, supra note 12, at 108.  Criminal laws are unlikely to be repealed once 
they have been enacted, so laws remain on the books when they serve no purpose.  Richard 
E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal Law Through a Crimi-
nal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1327, 1329 (2008); see generally DICK HYMAN,
THE TRENTON PICKLE ORDINANCE AND OTHER BONEHEAD LEGISLATION (1976) (catalogu-
ing outdated and irrational legislation).
400. James, supra note 12, at 108.
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at stake.401  Safety statutes often enact customs into law,402 and 
there is no reason to believe the statute becomes unfailingly ap-
plicable simply because the legislation has codified the standard.  
For example, a traffic statute may codify a standard method that 
drivers use to indicate to other drivers their intent to pass or turn.  
That does not mean that there are no other equally safe methods 
of signaling that drivers may readily adopt and on which they may 
rely.403 
It is also unrealistic to assume that legislatures endorse all 
standards that they enact into law.  That is certainly the case when 
states act in response to federal mandates.  States strongly disa-
greeing with the idea that the minimum drinking age should be 
twenty-one nonetheless enacted the requirement because of the 
financial consequences.404  The same was true when the federal 
government required that states reduce the drunk-driving thresh-
old and lower the speed limit to fifty-five.405  It is safe to assume 
that state legislatures have also enacted laws to appease special 
interest groups and not because they agreed with the policy.406 
401. The prosecutorial discretion inherent in the decision whether to enforce criminal
statutes accounts for these situations in criminal cases but there is no similar outlet in tort 
law.  Id.  The Third Restatement argues that the provision that excused statutory violations 
are not negligence per se prevents application of the doctrine in many cases in which public 
officials would choose not to prosecute.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 15 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010).  The narrow catego-
ries of available excuses, however, do not cover many cases in which a person might reason-
ably violate the law.  See infra text accompanying notes 415-16 & 436-37 (making the argu-
ment). 
402. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54 & note 196-97 (making this point).
403. See infra text accompanying notes 428-38 (discussing this point and giving ex-
amples). 
404. As a spokesman for Wisconsin’s governor stated when the state raised the drink-
ing age to twenty-one, “[i]t’s hard to lose a battle like this when you so disagree with the 
merits, but we had no real choice.”  Howard Witt & Robert Enstad, Wisconsin Jumps on 
Wagon: Officials Reluctantly Support Shift to 21 Drinking Age, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 10, 1986), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-04-10/news/86012 60391_1_drinking-age-legal-
drinking-wisconsin [https://perma.cc/S3XH-T23X]; see also Kritchevsky, supra note 12, at 
707-09 (discussing state disagreement with federal mandates).
405. See Kritchevsky, supra note 12, at 707-09.
406. See id. at 705-09 (explaining how states treat violations of federal mandates with 
which they disagree as negligence per se); see also James C. Fell & Robert B. Voas, Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving (MADD): The First 25 Years, 7 TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION, 195, 
197-98 (2006), https:// www.academia.edu/ 16040445/ Mothers_ Against_ Drunk_ Driving_
MADD_ The_ First_ 25_ Years [https://perma.cc /E7QZ-5U22] (discussing well-publicized 
incidents of deaths attributable to impaired drivers leading to the establishment of MADD,
which successfully crusaded for stricter impaired driver laws).
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Statutes that apply statewide necessarily generalize.  A leg-
islature may adopt a policy that is especially suited to some areas 
of the state, such as densely-populated cities, even though the 
standard is logically inapplicable to rural areas.  A state may adopt 
a law prohibiting drivers from using their cell phones out of a fear 
that phone use will cause accidents in city driving, but the law 
may not carve out exceptions for rural areas.407  A violation of the 
law would nonetheless be negligence per se statewide.  A state 
may also act quickly to enact a law in response to a pressing prob-
lem or external persuasion without considering how broadly it 
should apply or whether it should include exceptions.408  But all 
violations of these statutes would be negligence per se without 
consideration of whether giving the statutory standard that effect 
would further state legislative policy. 
The availability of exceptions to negligence per se does little 
to ameliorate the rigidity of the doctrine.  The law has always rec-
ognized some justifications for violating statutes.  The Second 
Restatement codified this notion, providing a list of situations that 
would excuse violations.409  The provision referred to cases in-
volving defendants who labored under an incapacity, acted in an 
emergency, or failed to know of the occasion for compliance or 
were unable to comply, and to situations in which compliance was 
more risky than noncompliance.410  The provision explicitly 
stated that the list was not exclusive.411  The Third Restatement 
lists essentially the same excuses as the Second Restatement—
incapacity, reasonable attempts to comply, inability to know of 
the statute’s applicability, and the danger of compliance.412  The 
407. New York and California have state-wide bans on using cell phones while driv-
ing, for instance.  See CAL. VEH. CODE § 23123 (West 2018); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 
1225-c (McKinney 2018).  There are certainly rural areas in both states where phone use 
would not pose a special risk.  See generally KAREN S. LISSY ET AL., HARV. CTR. FOR RISK 
ANALYSIS, CELLULAR PHONE USE WHILE DRIVING: RISKS AND BENEFITS (2000), http:// 
www.nsc.org/ Distracted Driving Documents/ Cellular-Phone-Use-While-Driving-Risk-
and-Benefits.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CPH-92WU] (discussing risks and benefits of cell 
phone use while driving). 
408. See sources cited supra notes 404-06.
409. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (AM. LAW INST. 1965); supra text
accompanying notes 132-34. 
410. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A.
411. Id. cmt. a.
412. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 15 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); supra text accompanying notes 162-70 (discussing Third 
Restatement approach).   
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Third Restatement, however, aims to restrict the availability of 
additional excuses.  It does not say that the list is non-exclusive 
and emphasizes the importance of elaborating the categories of 
excuse.413  It then provides that it is not an excuse that the defend-
ant believes the statute is unwise, does not know of the law, or 
that violation of the law is customary.414  “[N]or is it an excuse if 
there is a custom to depart from the statutory requirement.”415 
The Third Restatement’s rigid approach to excuses under-
mines the possibility that the doctrine of excused justifications 
will serve to mitigate the harshness of negligence per se in cases 
where there are sound reasons to violate a statute.  The provision, 
for instance, seemingly would not recognize an excuse if a person 
speeds to rush an injured friend to the hospital.416  And the Re-
statement certainly does not recognize an exception when a rea-
sonable person might violate a statute that is outdated or ill-suited 
to a situation.417 
The rigidity of the Restatement position on negligence per 
se does not necessarily promote safety; it may instead reward un-
safe conduct.  A state or municipality, for example, may make it 
illegal to talk on a phone while driving, but fail to enact a law 
prohibiting sending text messages.418  Texting, however, is more 
dangerous than simply talking on the phone.419  A person aware 
of the prohibition against phone calls who nonetheless has an im-
mediate need to relay a message would not be making a safer 
choice by sending a text.  If the person sending a text caused an 
413. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 15 cmt. a. 
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. See Twerski, supra note 12, at 1002 (explaining that the exception for conduct
when compliance poses a greater danger of physical harm to the actor or others than non-
compliance appears to apply only to road-related emergencies, such a driver swerving into 
another lane to avoid a child who has darted into the street). 
417. A person who used a cell phone while driving in a state with a ban would be per-
se negligent even if the person were answering an emergency call or talking in a rural area 
that was not the focus of the ban.  See Kritchevsky, supra note 12, at 694-95.  States similarly 
find that violations of statutes that the legislatures enacted in response to federal mandate to 
be negligence per se.  See id. at 707-09. 
418. See, e.g., Arizona Highway Safety Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N
(Jan. 2015), http:// www.ghsa.org/ html/ stateinfo/ bystate/ az.html [https://perma.cc/53EU-
24VJ]. 
419. See Sheila G. Klauer et al., Distracted Driving and Risk of Road Crashes among
Novice and Experienced Drivers, 370 N. ENG. J. MED. 54, 57-58 (2014). 
110 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  71:1 
accident, he would be able to argue to the jury that he was not 
negligent, or that he was only slightly negligent, because of the 
need to send the message.  The same driver who made a phone 
call and caused an accident would not.420 
The law’s refusal to recognize that customary conduct is rel-
evant to justify a statutory violation can also hinder safety.  Min-
imum speed limit laws recognize that a person who does not travel 
the prevailing speed poses a danger to others.421  An argument 
against the fifty-five mile-per-hour speed limit was that it hin-
dered safety on roads where drivers customarily disregarded the 
limit and drove sixty-five or seventy.422  Indeed, custom is rele-
vant in negligence litigation in part because individuals rely on 
others to follow the customary course of conduct and it is danger-
ous to act in a way that others do not anticipate.423  That would 
not change just because the custom involves disregarding a law. 
Commentators have long recognized that compliance with 
custom can be safer than compliance with a statute that others 
customarily ignore.  Professor Fleming James gave an example in 
an early article on the topic.  He discussed a traffic law that re-
quires drivers making a left turn to go to the right of the imaginary 
center of an intersection.424  The custom was to disobey the law 
and turn to the left of the imaginary center.425  That is the conduct 
other drivers expected.426  It is not hard to envision that a driver 
420. The narrow exceptions to negligence per se would not cover this situation be-
cause the driver is not avoiding physical harm by sending the message; an urgent need to 
communicate would not suffice.  See infra note 422 and accompanying text.  And although 
it would probably often be possible for the driver to stop driving to send the message, that 
may not always be the case.  Moreover, stopping could cause added danger (such as if the 
person is driving on a narrow, dark road at night), and it might take too much time to find a 
safe place to stop.  
421. See Victor Muchuruza & Renatus N. Mussa, Speeds on Rural Interstate High-
ways Relative to Posting the 40 MPH Minimum Speed Limit, BUREAU TRANSP. STAT., 
https:// www.rita.dot.gov/ bts/ sites/ rita. dot. gov. bts/ files/ publications/ journal_ of _ trans-
portation_ and_ statistics/ volume_ 07 _ number _ 23/ html/ paper_06/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/KZB8-2WA4]. 
422. Eric Peters, Highways Are Safe at Any Speed, WALL STREET J., Nov. 24, 1998, 
at A22; see generally Monreal v. Tobin, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 168 (Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting 
factfinder’s determination that driver who drove the posted speed limit of fifty-five was con-
tributorily negligent by driving in the middle lane of the freeway when surrounding traffic 
was traveling considerably faster). 
423. See supra text accompanying note 179-80.
424. James, supra note 12, at 109 n.50.
425. Id.
426. Id.
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who followed the letter of the law would cause an accident.  James 
explains that few things are more likely to disrupt traffic “than 
blind obedience to a statute that is uniformly disregarded.”427 
Courts have also recognized that a person’s compliance with 
custom may show that the actor exercised due care even when the 
conduct violates a statute.  The Minnesota Supreme Court reached 
this conclusion in Howard v. Marchildon,428 a case in which a 
driver used the customary signal to indicate a left turn instead of 
giving the statutorily-mandated signal.429  The court affirmed the 
decision that the plaintiff, who used the customary signal, was not 
contributorily negligent.430 
Key to the court’s decision was that Minnesota law made a 
violation of the statute prima facie evidence of negligence, not 
negligence per se.431  The court explained that the factfinder could 
not justify considering evidence of custom on a theory that “com-
mon consent” could substitute standards of conduct for those the 
legislature has prescribed.432  Custom could nonetheless be con-
sidered when a violation was only prima facie evidence of negli-
gence.  This was because a legislature’s determination that a stat-
utory violation was only prima facie evidence of negligence 
showed that the legislature contemplated that the jury could con-
sider other factors in determining negligence.433  The custom was 
relevant to the determination of whether the act was negligent.  
Courts do not reach the same conclusion when a statutory viola-
tion is negligence per se, however, because the rigid doctrine of 
negligence per se makes the evidence irrelevant.  “Obviously, 
where violation of a statute is negligence per se, evidence of a 
427. Id. at 109.
428. 37 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. 1949).
429. Id. at 835 (explaining that state law required that drivers whose cars did not have
turn signals to signal a left turn by extending the left arm out of the window during a turn 
but that it was customary for drivers to signal turns during winter by opening the driver-side 
door). 
430. Id. at 838.
431. Id. at 837.
432. Id.
433. Howard, 37 N.W.2d at 837.
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custom sanctioning violations of the stature would be irrelevant 
on the question of the existence of negligence.”434 
The point here is not that custom should trump positive law, 
or even that a jury should always be able to consider a custom of 
violating a statute.  A person who runs over a child while speeding 
in a school zone should not be able to justify the conduct simply 
by saying that it was customary to exceed the speed limit.435  Ra-
ther, the cases show that some customs can be safer than, or as 
safe as, statutory mandates, and the doctrine of negligence per se 
should not absolutely bar the jury from even considering the cus-
tom.  The customary means of signaling before turns that the court 
considered in Howard would not cease to be a custom on which 
other drivers relied, and thus potentially a reasonable way to act, 
if state law made a violation of the law negligence per se instead 
of prima facie evidence of negligence.  The legal difference 
would not change the expectations of the average driver. 
The fact that it is often customary to violate the law points 
to the undue rigidity of a doctrine of negligence per se that only 
allows for minimal excuses and does not even allow for judicial 
discretion in whether to send a case to the jury on negligence-per-
se grounds.  A court in such a case should at least be able to con-
sider whether to instruct the jury that it could consider the custom 
in determining negligence.436  The existence of prosecutorial dis-
cretion and administrative policies not to enforce certain laws 
shows that the executive branch recognizes that the positive law 
434. Am. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Wusich, 375 P.2d 364, 369 (Ariz. 1962) (en
banc).  The Wusich court explained, citing Howard, that evidence of custom was not admis-
sible to justify conduct that violates a statute unless the statutory violation is only considered 
prima facie evidence of negligence.  Id. at 368-69. 
435. The Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Elliott v. Callan, 466 P.2d 600 (Or. 
1970) (en banc), is such a case.  A driver who was speeding in a school zone hit and killed a 
child.  Id. at 601.  The driver sought to admit evidence that drivers customarily sped in the 
area.  Id.  The court said that testimony that speeding was customary should not have been 
admitted.  Id.  The court explained that the evidence would not suggest that the driver was 
driving safely, and that accepting the testimony would not show that his speed was reasona-
ble.  Id.  The court also explained that allowing the evidence would allow drivers to repeal a 
law by customarily disregarding it.  Id. at 601-02.  “Certainly the legislature did not intend 
the statute to be so evaded.”  Id. at 602. 
436. See Twerski, supra note 12, at 998-1003 (criticizing the rigidity of the Third 
Restatement’s sections on negligence per se and arguing that the section on excuses should 
be more open-ended and that trial judges should have discretion on whether to allow the jury 
to determine the standard of care). 
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should not be enforced literally.437  The judicial branch should 
have the same discretion.438 
Some laws on the books have no support in modern society 
and would not currently command a legislative majority; prose-
cutors do not enforce these laws because prevailing norms would 
not support enforcement.439  To the extent such laws serve a pur-
pose, it is as a vehicle for police harassment.440  Professor Cass R. 
Sunstein argues that citizens engage in legitimate rule revision 
when they violate rules that lack support in popular convic-
tions.441  “The same argument would apply to all situations in 
which rules or applications of otherwise valid criminal statutes 
have entirely fallen out of popular favor.  In disregarding palpably 
outdated rules or palpably outdated applications of modern rules, 
citizens are participating in a healthy and continuous process of 
democratic deliberation.”442 
The sort of politically-charged laws that Professor Sunstein 
discusses are unlikely to give rise to negligence-per-se liability 
because they do not purport to regulate safety.  But other politi-
cally-unpopular and widely-disregarded laws do.443  A theory of 
negligence per se that does not allow a court to consider the cus-
tom of disregarding the law allows the law to function arbitrarily, 
437. Prosecutorial discretion is a way the criminal justice system responds to over-
criminalization and the existence of outdated laws.  Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion 
and Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 643-56 (2002); Myers, supra note 399, at 1339-53.  
Similarly, it is established law that administrative agencies have broad discretion to set en-
forcement priorities and goals.  See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-33 (1985); Ken-
neth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 56, 56-62 (1970). 
438. The Restatement position is that the provision that excused violations of a statute 
are not negligence per se serves the same purpose as the existence of prosecutorial discretion.  
See supra text accompanying note 166.  Excuses cannot serve this purpose when courts have 
no discretion in which excuses to recognize, the Third Restatement’s position.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 167-69.  A decision-maker needs to be able to make choices to 
exercise discretion. 
439. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 1011 (1995) 
(discussing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S 186 (1986)); see also Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929, 
931-33 (2014) (discussing theory that the Supreme Court invalidates laws that are outliers,
enforced in only a few states).
440. Sunstein, supra note 439, at 1011 (discussing Bowers).
441. Id.
442. Id. at 1011-12.
443. See supra notes 404-05 (discussing minimum drinking age laws); see generally 
Kritchevsky, supra note 12 at 705-15. 
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resulting in disproportionate penalties on the handful of many vi-
olators who have the misfortune of getting into an accident even 
though no more blameworthy than the others.444 
This is not a new criticism of negligence per se.  Commen-
tators have argued since the days of the First Restatement that 
some statutes “are ill conceived, or hastily drawn, or obsolete,” 
and that negligence per se can lead to liability without fault and 
expose a person to substantial damages for minor deviations from 
accepted conduct.445  Just as widely-disregarded and rarely-en-
forced laws can be the vehicle for police harassment, widely-dis-
regarded and rarely-enforced laws can be the vehicle for what is 
essentially financial harassment or extortion through the doctrine 
of negligence per se.  Courts should have the power not to instruct 
juries on negligence per se when those laws are at stake.446 
C. How Negligence Per Se Can Reflect the Importance
of Law
The idea that laws are better suited to setting standards of 
conduct than custom or private standards does not support the 
doctrine of negligence per se.  Laws can be obsolete, ill-suited to 
the situation, and based on hasty or unfounded assumptions.  Fol-
lowing a law is not always the safest course of action, even when 
the law purports to regulate safety.  The fact that a law is in place 
does not justify using it to set the standard of care anymore than 
would the fact that a custom or private safety standard applies.447 
The fact that a law is in play does not justify applying the 
doctrine of negligence per se.  And the doctrine absolutely should 
not apply unless a law is at stake.  Negligence per se changes the 
role of the jury and the parties’ rights and duties.  The Connecticut 
Supreme Court explained this idea well in Wendland v. Ridgefield 
Construction Services, Inc.,448  holding that federal Occupational 
444. James, supra note 12, at 108.
445. Id. (noting also that negligence per se could expose an actor to substantial liability 
even when the statute only imposes a minor penalty for violations). 
446. See Twerski, supra note 12, at 998-1003.
447. One justification for negligence per se rests on a desire to defer to expert judg-
ment on what conduct is safe.  See supra text accompanying notes 127-31 (discussing this 
rationale).  That view would support granting safety standards negligence-per-se effect much 
more readily than statutes.  See supra note 293-96 (discussing expertise involved in setting 
safety standard). 
448. 439 A.2d 954 (Conn. 1981).
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Safety and Health Act regulations could not justify instructing the 
jury on negligence per se.449  The court explained that “[a] negli-
gence per se instruction transforms the character of the [jury’s] 
inquiry.”450  This in turn affects the applicable standard of care, a 
key factor in determining liability.451  Negligence per se thus af-
fects common law rights and duties.452  Negligence per se changes 
the jury from a deliberative body that determines what care is due 
in a situation to a body that performs the “historical” task of de-
termining what happened.453 
Only statutes should give rise to negligence-per-se liability 
because only legislative bodies can change tort law.  A private 
group’s standards or customary conduct cannot alter the common 
law.  Some cases discuss why only legislative action can give rise 
to negligence-per-se liability, but their analysis stops short.  
Those cases focus on the deference due legislative judgment and 
argue that a jury should not be able to change the standard of care 
that the legislature has established.454  The cases do not go on to 
discuss how deferring to the legislative judgment affects the un-
derlying tort analysis and the role of the jury. 
A focus on how the decision to defer to the legislative judg-
ment alters the jury’s role suggests a need to alter the doctrine of 
negligence per se.  The doctrine should apply only when the leg-
islature intended that consequence—when the legislature in-
tended that its action alter the jury’s traditional role.  Courts fre-
quently analyze legislative intent in negligence-per-se cases in 
determining whether the injury was of the sort the legislature in-
tended to prevent, or if the injured person was in the class the 
legislature intended the law to protect.455  But the courts generally 
do not take the further step of determining whether the legislature 
specifically intended that violation of the law be negligence per 
449. Id. at 956-58.
450. Id. at 956 (explaining that the jury in a negligence-per-se case does not decide if
the defendant acted as an ordinary prudent person but merely decides whether the defendant 
violated the relevant statute or regulation). 
451. Id.
452. Id. at 956-57.
453. Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes, supra note 12, at 455.
454. See Jorgensen v. Horton, 206 N.W.2d 100, 102 (Iowa 1973), and supra text
accompanying notes 373-79. 
455. These limits on when a statutory violation will be negligence per se have been 
in effect throughout the development of the doctrine.  See supra text accompanying notes 
84-90.
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se.456  They simply apply the doctrine, implicitly assuming that 
the legislature so intended.457  The idea, from the earliest days of 
the doctrine, has been that the legislature knows of the doctrine of 
negligence per se and so intends that it apply to violations of 
standards it sets.458  Even if this assumption were once true, it is 
hard to envision that any legislature intends that statutes that del-
egate broad power to agencies or that incorporate private stand-
ards will change tort law.459 
A focus on legislative intent suggests various ways courts 
could limit negligence per se.  These approaches reflect two dif-
ferent focal points.  One approach would focus on the law itself; 
courts could only apply negligence per se if there is an indication 
that the legislature intended the doctrine to apply.  The other ap-
proach would focus on the courts and give a court more leeway 
in deciding when to give the jury a negligence-per-se instruction 
by allowing the court to determine probable legislative intent in 
the situation. 
Courts could try more closely to match the scope of negli-
gence per se to situations in which the legislature likely intended 
the doctrine to apply by limiting the doctrine to violations of state 
law.  This approach would assume that a state legislature adopting 
safety law to benefit a class of persons intends that law to set a 
standard of care that applies in tort litigation.460  It would not, 
however, apply the doctrine when a municipality or agency set 
the standard, when a federal law was at issue, or when the statute 
incorporated a private standard.  This approach would have the 
benefit of ensuring that only state legislative action altered the 
contours of state tort law.  It would not, however, avoid the diffi-
cult problems of inquiring into legislative intent that courts would 
still have to face in determining whether the legislature intended 
456. Thayer, supra note 12, at 320
457. See id.
458. This idea reaches back to Thayer, id. at 322-23, and continues in the Third Re-
statement.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 14 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010); see supra note 392 and accompanying text. 
459. It is often far from clear whether the legislature even intended to incorporate a
private standard into law.  See supra Part II.D. 
460. This approach would follow the Third Restatement’s suggestion that legislatures
intended safety statutes to set a standard of care only when the legislature set the standard 
itself.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 14 cmt. c. 
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to benefit a certain class or if the injury were of the sort the legis-
lature aimed to prevent.  But this approach would still rest on a 
far-reaching assumption that the legislature actually intended the 
safety standard to set the tort standard of care.  Furthermore, this 
approach would not mitigate the rigidity of negligence per se in 
situations in which the legislature had acted.  An individual could 
still be found per se negligent for breaching an outdated or ill-
considered law. 
Many of the same problems would attend an approach that 
took the focus on legislative intent further and placed the onus on 
the state legislature explicitly to state whether it intended a viola-
tion of a law to have negligence-per-se effect.  Courts would 
likely face difficult questions of deciphering intent:  did a statute 
that explicitly referred to the “standard of care” show an intent for 
the statute to apply in tort actions, was a textual statement of in-
tent required, did the legislature have to use the words “negli-
gence per se”?  Moreover, although this approach would provide 
certainty when the legislature explicitly endorsed or precluded 
negligence per se,461 courts would still be left to decipher intent 
when the statutory language was ambiguous.  This approach also 
would not eliminate the problem of holding someone per se liable 
under an outdated or hastily-drafted statute.  The legislature could 
react to political pressure by quickly enacting a statute and 
providing that violations are negligence per se and the statute 
would likely stay on the books long after, no matter how ill-con-
sidered the provisions. 
Another way of ensuring the reach of negligence per se bet-
ter reflects legislative intent is to put more discretion in the hands 
of trial judges to determine when the doctrine should apply by 
asking if the legislature logically would intend it to apply in that 
case.  One way to do this would be to increase judicial discretion 
by broadening the range of cases in which courts find statutory 
violations excused.  The idea would be that broadening permissi-
ble excuses would make application of negligence per se more 
461. States have explicitly provided that violation of certain statutes is not negligence 
per se.  See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.125(5) (West 2017) (providing that failure to 
wear a seat belt is not negligence per se); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-6540(C) (2017) (stating 
that failure to wear a seat belt is not negligence per se).   
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closely mirror likely decisions to enforce the law.462  This ap-
proach would explicitly grant courts the discretion not to instruct 
on negligence per se when the actor had a strong justification for 
not following the law or when the law was rarely enforced or 
widely ignored.  Professor Twerski recommends this approach, 
suggesting that the comments to the Third Restatement’s provi-
sion on excused violations of law state that the exceptions in the 
provision “are illustrative of the kinds of situations in which 
courts have refused to apply the statutory standard in civil tort 
litigation. They are not meant to exhaust the possibilities.”463  
This approach reflects the reality that negligence is fact-sensitive 
and that statutes written in general terms cannot reflect the myriad 
of situations where an actor will have valid reasons for not meet-
ing a standard.464  This approach does, though, add uncertainty to 
the reach of the doctrine, perhaps a reason the drafters of the Third 
Restatement found it “essential” to enumerate excuses.465 
A broader approach would reach beyond the idea of enlarg-
ing the exceptions to negligence per se and grant courts discretion 
to determine when a violation of a statute should impose negli-
gence-per-se liability.  Courts could explicitly recognize that a 
statute is outdated, or rarely enforced, or otherwise ill-suited as a 
standard of care.  This view would partially reflect a power that 
courts already have; courts now judge whether a statutory viola-
tion should be negligence per se by looking at the class of persons 
the legislature aimed to protect and the goal the legislature aimed 
to accomplish.466  Certainly, courts can broaden or narrow the 
462. The recognition of exceptions, that not all statutory violations will be negligence 
per se, aims to make application of the doctrine reflect cases in which executive officials 
would actually enforce the law.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 15 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (providing that the 
provision that excused statutory violations are not negligence per se prevents application of 
the doctrine in many cases in which public officials would choose not to prosecute).  The 
rigidity with which the Restatement defines permissible excuses prevents the provision from 
adequately serving this goal, however.  See supra text accompanying notes 415-16 & 435-
36. 
463. Twerski, supra note 12, at 1002-03 (suggesting revision to Section 15, comment
a of the Third Restatement); see supra text accompanying notes 162-67 (discussing Section 
15 of the Third Restatement). 
464. Twerski, supra note 12, at 1003.
465. See supra text accompanying notes 162-67 (discussing Third Restatement’s ap-
proach to excused violations). 
466. See Rosenau v. City of Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125, 128 (Iowa 1972) (“In those 
situations we have said each case is to be decided in light of the purpose and intent of the 
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reach of negligence per se by interpreting purpose or class of in-
tended beneficiaries either broadly or narrowly.467  Courts could 
similarly engage in a general inquiry into whether the legislature 
intended the legislation to set the tort standard of care. 
This approach would resemble the approach the Third Re-
statement recommends that courts use to decide whether a statute 
requiring an actor to act to protect another imposes an affirmative 
duty to act.468  The Restatement’s comments explain that some 
statutes expressly provide a private right of action for failure to 
perform a statutory duty, whereas others preclude one.469  In the 
interstices, “courts may consider the legislative purpose and the 
values reflected in the statute to decide that the purpose and val-
ues justify adopting a duty that the common law had not previ-
ously recognized.”470  This same general approach could apply to 
determine whether a statutory standard of care should govern in a 
tort suit.471  The court could consider evidence that the legislature 
intended the standard to apply in civil actions and whether the 
statute reflects the predominant community sentiment of appro-
priate conduct.472 
pertinent statute or ordinance.”); supra text accompanying notes 154-57 (discussing role of 
legislative intent under the Third Restatement). 
467. Courts’ varying answers to questions such as whether violation of licensing stat-
utes is negligence per se illustrates this point.  See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, 
§ 36, at 222-27 (discussing cases on applicability of negligence per se).
468. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 38 (AM. LAW INST. 2012)  (“When a statute requires an actor to act for the protection 
of another, the court may rely on the statute to decide that an affirmative duty exists and to 
determine the scope of the duty.”). 
469. Id. cmt. c.
470. Id.
471. This would not necessarily be a big step.  The recognition of a duty to act is not
the same as negligence per se, which presupposes a duty to act and adopts the statutory 
standard of care in acting.  Id. cmt. d.  Courts often confuse the two inquires, however, and 
apply negligence per se to violations of statutes that impose duties.  Id. § 38 reporters’ note; 
see generally Forell, supra note 12 (discussing issue). 
472. See Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mgmt. Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (ex-
plaining that penal statutes protecting individuals impose a duty of care “based on contem-
porary community values and ethics” and that the law of torts will be out of step with com-
munity standards if it ignores such duties).  Under this approach, for example, a court could 
find that popular and legislative resistance to imposing a minimum drinking age of twenty-
one meant that a person who violated the law by selling beer to a twenty year-old was not 
negligent per se.  See Kritchevsky, supra note 12, at 707-09 (discussing states’ resistance to 
the federally-mandated drinking age). 
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An approach to negligence per se that explicitly considers 
the current validity of a penal standard, in terms of whether it ac-
curately reflects community sentiment, would enable tort law bet-
ter to reflect contemporary values and mitigate the rigidities and 
inequities that negligence per se can create.473  This approach 
would build on the courts’ current role in inquiring into a legisla-
ture’s purpose and whether an excuse applies “in an effort to re-
turn to the jury responsibility for determining whether reasonable 
care was exercised in the circumstances.”474 Vesting courts with 
the power to determine that a statute does not reflect community 
sentiment certainly is at odds with the idea that the doctrine re-
flects an obligation to defer to legislative judgment, but it better 
accords with the “ethics of particularism” that underlies modern 
tort law than does rigid application of negligence per se.475 
All of these approaches keep the basic doctrine of negligence 
per se; they accept the current doctrine that the legislature may 
define the standard of care but aim to restrict its reach either by 
limiting the contexts in which it applies or by giving trial judges 
some measure of discretion in determining whether to apply it in 
any given case.  The history of the doctrine suggests a different 
approach, however.  Negligence per se initially applied to viola-
tions of custom and judge-made rules as well as statutory viola-
tions.476  Increased respect for the role of the jury and a recogni-
tion that absolute rules were ill-suited to tort cases led courts to 
reject per se rules when custom and common-law rules were in 
play.  The reasons courts did so suggest that courts should do the 
same in the case of statutory violations. 
473. See Whetzel, 282 F.2d at 946-47 (discussing Holmes’s view that the vitality of
the common law depends on its ability to reflect contemporary community values and com-
mentators’ criticisms of negligence per se). 
474. Id. at 947.
475. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 8 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (discussing the “ethics of particular-
ism”); supra text accompanying notes 143-47.   
476. See supra Part I.A.
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IV. THE BETTER RESOLUTION: A RETURN TO
HISTORY 
Justice Frankfurter said that the doctrine of assumption of 
the risk was an “excellent illustration of the extent to which un-
critical use of words bedevils the law.”477  The point applies 
equally well to negligence per se.  “A phrase begins life as a lit-
erary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repe-
tition soon establishes it as a legal formula, undiscriminatingly 
used to express different and sometimes contradictory ideas.”478  
The term negligence per se began as one of various formulations 
courts used to explain why the question of whether the defendant 
acted reasonably would not go to the jury.479  The term first ap-
plied to violations of custom, and then developed to apply to vio-
lations of statutes and judge-made standards of conduct.480  Cases 
and treatise authors came to use the term to apply only to statutory 
violations, and that meaning stuck.481 
The term negligence per se has remained for a century to re-
fer to the doctrine that adopts a legislatively-established standard 
of care as the standard for negligence actions and that thus takes 
the question of whether the defendant acted reasonably from the 
jury.482  The jury simply determines whether the defendant vio-
lated the statutory standard; if so, the jury is told that the defend-
ant was negligent.483  This doctrine has remained in force, and 
indeed expanded in scope and importance, despite the changed 
jury role in cases alleging violation of custom or accepted safety 
precautions and in negligence litigation generally. 
Cases and commentary in the modern era explain in detail 
why a jury should determine whether a person exercised due care 
even when the conduct violated a custom or judge-made rule.  
Judge-made rules should not be absolute standards of conduct be-
cause, given the variety of circumstances that could be present in 
any general fact scenario, the standard suitable for the average 
477. Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring). 
478. Id.
479. See supra Part I.A.
480. Id.
481. See supra Part I.B.
482. See Twerski, supra note 12, at 998.
483. See supra text accompanying note 176-77 (quoting jury instructions).
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case might not be appropriate in a specific situation.484  Cases 
should go to a jury for a determination of whether the defendant 
acted reasonably.485  Customs should not serve as set rules of law 
because noncompliance with custom does not necessarily mean 
that the conduct was less safe.486  Even if the conduct were less 
safe, the deviation from custom could have been insubstantial, the 
deviation could have been reasonable, or the conduct could have 
been only slightly less safe than the custom.487  Customs that are 
generally reasonable may not be reasonable in light of the facts of 
a particular case and, although some customs may be the product 
of careful decision, others arise from inadvertence or neglect.488  
These concerns led courts to treat noncompliance with custom as 
evidence of negligence, not negligence per se.489  Custom is just 
one piece of evidence for the jury in determining negligence.490 
The entrenched law of negligence per se has led courts to fail 
to see that statutes can have the same problems as do judge-made 
standards, custom, and private standards.491  Statutes that are 
suited for general situations may not be applicable to particular 
situations.  Noncompliance with a statute may not be less safe 
than compliance.  Noncompliance with a statute may be insub-
stantial or only slightly less safe than compliance.  Statutes may 
be the result of hasty and ill-informed decision-making.  A recog-
nition of these facts should lead courts to turn to history and reject 
the rigid doctrine of negligence per se.  A violation of a statute is 
certainly relevant to the question of negligence and is certainly 
something the jury should be able to consider.  But the jury should 
also be able to consider the facts of the situation and make the 
decision of whether, ultimately, the defendant acted reasonably. 
484. See Pokora v, Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1934); supra text accom-
panying notes 102-10 (discussing Pokora). 
485. See Pokora, 292 U.S. at 106 (finding that a defendant was not per se contributo-
rily negligent for failing to exit his car at a railroad crossing and remanding for further pro-
ceedings). 
486. Morris, supra note 207, at 1152.
487. Id. at 1161-62; see supra text accompanying notes 215-34 (discussing Morris
and other early commentary on the role of custom). 
488. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
489. Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); see supra Part II.B. 
490. See supra note 249 (quoting jury instructions).  The law treats violations of
standards that lack the force of law in the same way as it treats customs.  Supra text accom-
panying notes 254-63. 
491. For elaboration on the points in this paragraph, see supra Part III.B.
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This approach would make only slight inroads into the doc-
trine of legislative comity—the core of the current doctrine of 
negligence per se.492  Negligence per se now applies in numerous 
cases in which any notion of legislative intent to set a standard is 
remote at best: in cases involving municipal ordinances, adminis-
trative regulations, private standards that the legislature gave le-
gal force, and federal laws and regulations.493  Even when a state 
statute has set a standard, it is unlikely that the legislature con-
sciously intended that it have negligence-per-se effect.  To the ex-
tent that negligence per se rests on an assumption that the legisla-
ture intends its standard to apply in tort, it is fair to call the notion 
“pure fiction, concocted for the purpose.”494  Legislative silence 
means either that the legislature did not consider civil suits at all 
or neglected to provide for them.495  Legislative comity is more 
of a concern when a jury decision is directly at odds with a legis-
lative judgment—when a jury specifically finds that conduct that 
the legislature considered to be unsafe and that caused harm to 
another nonetheless manifested as due care.496  But even in those 
cases a jury award does not necessarily honor legislative intent.  
The violation of the statute could be excused through prosecuto-
rial discretion, and that doctrine’s recognition that it is unrealistic 
to assume that any general standard unwaveringly governs every 
case.  Even absent a recognition that statutes do not universally 
apply, the fairness to the defendant in a particular case and respect 
for the jury justify the slight incursion on a legislature’s presump-
tive intent.  A legislature that intends a standard to govern in tort 
could always enact a statute to that effect. 
Negligence per se is the remnant of a time when juries played 
a lesser role in tort litigation than they do now.  Courts routinely 
took cases from the jury when the judge believed the jury could 
only reach one decision on negligence—whether the defendant 
violated a custom, a statute, or a judge-made rule.  The defendant 
in all of those cases was negligent per se.  The jury’s role has 
increased over time and courts have been increasingly reluctant 
492. See supra text accompanying notes 149-57.
493. See supra text accompanying notes 149-63.
494. KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 36, at 221.
495. Id.
496. See Thayer, supra note 12, at 323 (giving this possibility as a reason for adopting 
negligence per se). 
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to assume that general rules apply to particular cases.497  This 
ethic of particularism has led courts to refrain from enforcing 
common-law rules of negligence and to allow juries to determine 
if a defendant who violated a custom is negligent.498  Negligence 
per se has remained in cases of statutory violations without any 
clear explanation as to why that should be so.  At the same time, 
the doctrine reaches an increasing number of cases.  The doctrine 
has an increased potency due to both its reach and because it, 
alone, takes cases from the jury.  Courts should consider the his-
tory of negligence per se and recognize that the reasons that led 
courts to allow juries to consider cases of custom, and to stop en-
forcing judge-made rules of conduct, also dictate stepping back 
from rigid adherence to negligence per se.  Juries should consider 
evidence of statutory violations in determining negligence but 
should not be instructed to find defendants negligent.499 
CONCLUSION 
Courts say only violations of law are negligence per se be-
cause the conduct contravenes a legislative determination of the 
proper standard of care.  Legislative action is what differentiates 
law from custom and the judge-made standards cases that also 
originally gave rise to negligence-per-se liability.  Violations of 
custom and common law stopped giving rise to a finding that the 
actor was per se negligent for various reasons: the recognition that 
general rules do not fit all cases, the fear that a custom does not 
reflect the safest conduct, the fear that the standard could be out-
of-date, poorly thought out, or logically inapplicable.  All of these 
reasons reflect the ethic of particularism that supports deciding 
tort cases on their facts.  They also recognize a role for the jury in 
497. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
498. See supra text accompanying notes 141-45.
499. This is the law in some states.  The Third Restatement explains that approxi-
mately a dozen states treat statutory violations as evidence of negligence.  RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 reporters’ note 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010).  A few states conclude that statutory violations create a rebuttable 
presumption of negligence, or prima facie proof of negligence.  Id. (saying that this position 
is congruent with the Restatement position).  So it is possible, then, to consider this approach 
as a modification of negligence per se or a variation of the doctrine.  A clearer approach is 
to look to history, however.  The history of negligence per se and its origins support adopting 
a position that explicitly rejects the current doctrine of negligence per se and equates viola-
tions of statutes, customs, and private standards.  
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tort litigation: the jury, as the voice of the community, determines 
how a reasonable member of the community would act. 
The cases offer no explanation of why the same development 
has not occurred with legal standards.  But the idea of adherence 
to legal standards has never been absolute, in criminal or tort law.  
The long-ago abandonment of the outlaw approach to negligence 
per se establishes that negligence per se is not a punishment for 
violating the law.500  Instead, the doctrine aims to defer to a leg-
islative determination of proper conduct.501  But the idea that leg-
islative judgment deserves deference is not absolute.  The law has 
long recognized the idea of prosecutorial discretion and recog-
nized that some laws are outdated and unenforced.  Courts have 
similarly recognized exceptions to negligence per se.  The excep-
tions are narrow, however, and do not recognize that statutes, like 
custom and private rules of conduct, may be outdated or unsuited 
to a particular situation.502  The exceptions do not recognize the 
need for some measure of discretion in determining whether a 
statutory standard should govern civil litigation.  They do not em-
brace the ethic of particularism, the recognition that cases differ 
and that the jury’s job is determining when a general rule applies 
to a particular case. 
Courts should recognize that the ethic of particularism is as 
applicable to violations of positive law as it is to cases dealing 
with violations of custom, common law, or private standards.  
Courts should allow juries to consider the statutory violations, but 
only to consider the violation as evidence of negligence.  Courts 
should, in other words, take the next step that the history of the 
law of negligence per se suggests.  The law has developed to treat 
violations of custom and common-law standards as only evidence 
of negligence, not determinative of the question.  The same 
should be true of violations of law. 
500. See supra text accompanying notes 87-92.
501. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
502. See supra Part III.B.
